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Do Social Movements Spur Corporate Change? The Rise of
“MeToo Termination Rights” in CEO Contracts
RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN, JAMES HICKS &
STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON∗
Do social movements spur corporate change? This Article sheds new empirical and
theoretical light on the issue through an original study of executive contracts before
and after MeToo. The MeToo movement, beginning in late 2017, exposed a
workplace culture seemingly permissive of high-level, sex-based misconduct.
Companies typically responded slowly and imposed few consequences on
perpetrators, often allowing them to depart with lucrative exit packages. Why did
companies reward rather than penalize bad actors, and has the movement disrupted
this culture of complicity?
The passage of time since the height of the movement allows us to investigate
these issues empirically, using the lens of executive contracts. Economic theory
posits that CEO employment agreements are not negotiated at arm’s length and
contain terms that strongly favor the executive. We hypothesize that these
dynamics—typically associated with outsized compensation packages—resulted in
pro-executive termination provisions that left room for executives to engage in sexbased misconduct without fear of reprisal. We argue that the MeToo movement
represented a major shock to these bargaining dynamics and predict that, in the face
of new reputational and liability risks, corporate boards will seek to reserve greater
power to terminate CEOs for sex-based misconduct in post-MeToo agreements.
We test—and substantiate—our hypotheses using a novel dataset of CEO
employment agreements. We focus on changes to the contractual definition of a “forcause” termination. In the wake of MeToo, we find a significant and growing rise in
the prevalence of what we call “MeToo termination rights”—definitions of cause
that permit companies to terminate CEOs without severance pay in cases of
harassment, discrimination, and violations of company policy. Such grounds for
cause broadly capture most forms of sex-based misconduct.
This documented rise in “MeToo termination rights” holds important lessons for
corporate governance, executive contracting, and gender equity. First, our results
show that external shocks can disrupt traditional corporate bargaining dynamics,
bringing contract terms more in line with changing expectations. Second, our results
provide insight into contract design, suggesting possible tradeoffs that companies
make in structuring these novel termination rights. Finally, our results can be
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understood as reflecting a realignment of the treatment of top-level executives with
the treatment of ordinary workers, who have long been subject to capacious sexual
harassment policies.
We conclude that the rise in “MeToo termination rights” offers evidence of
increased corporate control of CEO behavior and greater institutional
accountability for sex-based misconduct. We are therefore cautiously optimistic
about the long-term effects of MeToo and the ability of powerful social movements
to inspire change within private institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Five years ago, investigative journalists broke the news of film mogul Harvey
Weinstein’s decades-long history of sex-based misconduct, launching the viral
movement that became #MeToo.1 Many of the consequences of the movement have

1. See Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment
Accusers
for
Decades,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html
[https://perma.cc/3599-SHVN]. Five days later, actress Alyssa Milano triggered an outpouring
of responses when she tweeted that anyone who had experienced sexual harassment or assault
should reply “me too” to her tweet, launching what became a viral hashtag movement. See
Mary Pflum, A Year Ago, Alyssa Milano Started a Conversation About #MeToo. These Women
Replied., NBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/year-agoalyssa-milano-started-conversation-about-metoo-these-women-n920246
[https://perma.cc/CT5F-M8KS]. Ms. Milano credited Tarana Burke, who in 2007 used “Me
Too” as the slogan for her nonprofit organization that assists sexual abuse victims. Sandra E.
Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html
[https://perma.cc/N8LR-LQ4A]. For a detailed account of the events and allegations that
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played out in the public arena, either in the media or the statehouse. In just the first
year following the watershed Weinstein revelations, some 200 individuals were
ousted from positions of power due to allegations of sex-based misconduct,2 and new
allegations continue to surface.3 Companies have publicly committed to initiatives
aimed at eliminating discrimination and improving diversity and transparency.4

coalesced to form the movement, see Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Colleen
Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 50–54; see
also Jamillah Bowman Williams, Lisa Singh & Naomi Mezey, #MeToo as Catalyst: A
Glimpse into 21st Century Activism, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 371, 375–79 (discussing the value
and impact of social media in defining the MeToo movement).
2. Between October 2017 and October 2018, approximately 200 high-profile individuals
were accused of and suffered consequences for sex-based misconduct. See Audrey Carlsen,
Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel & Zach Wichter,
#MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women.,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html
[https://perma.cc/T3QV-84TK] (Oct. 29, 2018); Post-Weinstein, These Are the Powerful Men
Facing
Sexual
Harassment
Allegations,
GLAMOUR
(May
18,
2019),
https://www.glamour.com/gallery/post-weinstein-these-are-the-powerful-men-facing-sexualharassment-allegations [https://perma.cc/VV32-H9SU].
3. See, e.g., Ryan Mac, SpaceX Executive Defends Elon Musk Against Misconduct
Accusations,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
23,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/technology/spacex-elon-musk.html
[https://perma.cc/7KRH-KLJE]; Sharon Terlep & Suzanne Kapner, CVS Ousts Executives
After Internal Probe, Vows to Overhaul How It Handles Sexual-Harassment
Complaints, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/cvs-ousts-executives-afterinternal-probe-vows-to-overhaul-how-it-handles-sexual-harassment-complaints11647024845?mod=hp_lead_pos3 [https://perma.cc/3SJF-EAWG] (Mar. 11, 2022, 2:25 PM);
Brian Stelter & Oliver Darcy, CNN President Jeff Zucker Resigns over Consensual
Relationship with Key Lieutenant, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/02/media/jeffzucker-cnn/index.html [https://perma.cc/9QFQ-LAUL] (Feb. 2, 2022, 5:50 PM); Sarah E.
Needleman, Activision Blizzard Executives Exit as Company Faces Gender-Bias Lawsuit,
WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/activision-replaces-blizzard-head-j-allen-brack-asit-grapples-with-gender-bias-lawsuit-11627999132?mod=Searchresults_pos8&page=1
[https://perma.cc/D7S7-C4FR] (Aug. 3, 2021, 7:24 PM); David Yaffe-Bellany, McDonald’s
Fires C.E.O. Steve Easterbrook After Relationship with Employee, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/business/mcdonalds-ceo-fired-steve-easterbrook.html
[https://perma.cc/K889-B72N].
4. See, e.g., Janelle Griffith, Google Changes Sexual Harassment Policies After
Employee
Walkout,
NBC
NEWS
(Nov.
8,
2018,
1:04
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/google-changes-sexual-harassment-policies-afteremployee-walkout-n934046 [https://perma.cc/D23V-NWV6]; Nick Wingfield & Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Microsoft Moves to End Secrecy in Sexual Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/technology/microsoft-sexualharassment-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/7EVU-484K]; Imani Moise, Wells Fargo Ends
Forced
Arbitration
for
Sexual
Harassment
Claims,
REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-harassment/wells-fargo-ends-forcedarbitration-for-sexual-harassment-claims-idUSKBN2062J4 [https://perma.cc/7S6Q-6UK6]
(Feb. 12, 2020, 12:35 PM). Notably, many companies hired or promoted women when
replacing men ousted for sex-based misconduct. See Carlsen, Salam, Miller, Lu, Ngu, Patel &
Wichter, supra note 2. For a review and assessment of the corporate response, see generally
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Congress and state legislatures have enacted new and amended legislation seeking
to increase sexual harassment training, enhance victims’ ability to bring claims, and
improve transparency around the resolution of disputes.5
Yet we know little about what happened within companies in the wake of the
movement. A critical question is whether MeToo has led to greater institutional
accountability for the misconduct of high-level actors. The central stories of the
movement brought to light not only the pervasiveness of sex-based misconduct6 but
in many companies, an organizational culture seemingly permissive of such
wrongdoing when perpetrated by powerful individuals. In the most egregious
examples, the misconduct went on for years, targeted multiple victims, and was an

Amelia Miazad, How the #MeToo Movement Is Transforming Corporate Governance, in THE
GLOBAL #METOO MOVEMENT 459, 459–73 (Ann M. Noel & David B. Oppenheimer eds.,
2020) [hereinafter Miazad, #MeToo Movement]; Amelia Miazad, Sex, Power, and Corporate
Governance, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1913 (2021) [hereinafter Miazad, Corporate
Governance].
5. The legislative response to MeToo has taken various forms. It includes reforms
targeting sexual harassment and discrimination specifically, such as state laws that mandate
sexual harassment training and/or alter the threshold for demonstrating actionable sexual
harassments. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.9 (West 2019); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West
2022); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950 (West 2020); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1 (West 2020);
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 19, § 711A (2019); Workplace Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 101-0221,
2019 Ill. Legis. Serv. 101-0221 (West); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-101(E) (West 2022);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 807 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 (West 2022);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-g (McKinney 2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (McKinney 2019); S.B. 1586,
81st Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2022); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.141 (West 2021);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.640.020 (West 2022). It also includes reforms seeking to
promote transparency in the resolution of sexual harassment and discrimination claims, such
as the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, which
prohibits forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims, 9 U.S.C.A. § 402 (West), the federal
Speak Out Act, S. 4524, 117th Cong. § 4(a) (2022), and various state laws that prohibit the
use of confidential settlement clauses. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2022);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002 (West 2020); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12964.5 (West 2022); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.8 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-36 (2020); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-b (McKinney 2019); S.B. 1586, 81st
Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2022); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-108 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 495h (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.211 (2022); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.840
(2018); H.B. 1795, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2022). For a summary of legislative activity
in the immediate aftermath of MeToo, including bill tracking, see generally Williams, Singh
& Mezey, supra note 1, at 386–89.
6. We use the term “sex-based misconduct” as shorthand for the wide range of
objectionable behaviors brought to light by the MeToo movement, recognizing that not all
instances of such behavior were proved to have occurred nor, had they been, would necessarily
have constituted sexual harassment. Our focus in this Article is on corporate boards’ ability to
take action against behavior that jeopardizes (mostly women) workers irrespective of its
legality. For a taxonomy of the various forms of sex-based misconduct implicated by the
movement and their relationship to sexual harassment law, see Rachel Arnow-Richman,
Finding Balance, Forging a Legacy: Harassers’ Rights and Employer Best Practices in the
Era of MeToo, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Best Practices].
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open secret among corporate higher-ups.7 Yet pre-MeToo, these companies
responded slowly and imposed few consequences on alleged perpetrators, preferring
to cover up the problem with confidential settlements and cushioned exits.8
This phenomenon—what we refer to as the “MeToo accountability problem”—
came as no surprise to employment discrimination scholars. These commentators
have long bemoaned the limits of antidiscrimination law in effecting cultural change
within workplaces.9 They have observed that, in the case of sexual harassment,
deeply rooted gender inequity can coexist alongside “zero tolerance” policies and
corporate commitments to diversity.10 Worse yet, companies may deploy such
policies instrumentally in service to other managerial goals,11 aggressively policing

7. See, e.g., Monica Hesse & Dan Zak, Violence. Threats. Begging. Harvey Weinstein’s
30-Year Pattern of Abuse in Hollywood, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/violence-threats-begging-harveyweinsteins-30-year-pattern-of-abuse-in-hollywood/2017/10/14/2638b1fc-aeab-11e7-be94fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html [https://perma.cc/8A9E-TP6E] (reporting that Weinstein’s conduct
was widely known or suspected by colleagues, employees, reporters, and others around him);
Matthew Goldstein, Tiffany Hsu & Kenneth P. Vogel, Stephen Wynn, Casino Mogul, Accused
of
Decades
of
Sexual
Misconduct,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
26,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/steve-wynn-sexual-misconduct-claims.html
[https://perma.cc/P75T-NBVZ] (reporting that Wynn’s misconduct continued for decades and
that numerous female employees had complained over the years to their supervisors); John
Koblin, The Year of Reckoning at CBS: Sexual Harassment Allegations and Attempts to Cover
Them Up, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/business/media/cbs-sexualharassment-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/E63N-SW4K] (Dec. 17, 2018) (reporting
investigations into CBS’s company-wide culture after three high-profile executives were
accused of sexual harassment by dozens of women over a span of thirteen months); Emily
Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as Harassment
Settlements
Add
Up,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-foxnews.html [https://perma.cc/Y8SA-ZPQY].
8. A widely publicized example is Google’s treatment of Android-creator Andy Rubin,
who was given a $90 million exit package following credible allegations of sexual misconduct.
Daisuke Wakabayashi & Katie Benner, How Google Protected Andy Rubin, the ‘Father of
Android’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/technology/google-sexual-harassment-andyrubin.html [https://perma.cc/WNR5-4EYT]; cf. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill
O’Reilly Settled New Harassment Claim, Then Fox Renewed His Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexualharassment.html [https://perma.cc/SKZ2-ZV2Q] (reporting how 21st Century Fox favorably
treated Bill O’Reilly—renewing his contract and ultimately terminating him with a $25
million payout—despite multiple credible and settled allegations of harassment against him).
9. This literature is too vast to be thoroughly captured here. For a brief but
comprehensive summary of the limits of sexual harassment law and the complaint and
response system within organizations, see Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now? What
Next?, 69 DUKE L.J. 377, 380–94 (2019).
10. This critique focuses principally on the Court-created liability structure surrounding
hostile work-environment harassment, which many believe encourages mere symbolic
compliance with antidiscrimination law. See infra note 169.
11. See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC
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the behavior of marginalized workers while turning a blind eye to the sex-based
misconduct of corporate stars deemed too valuable to lose.12
The MeToo movement, with its revelations of high-level misconduct and
corporate complicity, has revived these concerns within the employment
discrimination discourse.13 Yet an emerging, more optimistic body of literature is
examining this problem from a corporate governance perspective. 14 This work relies
on increased stakeholder attention to the reputational consequences and liability risks
associated with sex-based misconduct in the wake of the MeToo movement.15

CIVIL RIGHTS 33–37 (2016) (describing how employers respond to legal mandates by
implementing compliance measures in ways that advance their organizational interests); Vicki
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2087–88 (2003) (describing how
employers have leveraged sexual harassment law to tamp down on personal expression,
advance productivity goals, and provide justification for eliminating out-of-favor employees).
12. See Best Practices, supra note 6; Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process:
Handling Harassers in an At-Will World, 128 YALE L.J.F. 85 (2018) [hereinafter Power and
Process]; Schultz, supra note 11; cf. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,
Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22 (2018) (arguing that employers’ conferral of unfettered power to
favored employees encourages and enables sexual harassment).
13. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, The Sexual Harassment Loophole, 78 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 155 (2021); Kenneth R. Davis, Strong Medicine: Fighting the Sexual Harassment
Pandemic, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057 (2018); Lauren B. Edelman & Jessica Cabrera, Sex-Based
Harassment and Symbolic Compliance, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361 (2020); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Harassment, Workplace Culture, and the Power and Limits of Law, 70 AM. U. L.
REV. 419 (2020); Joanna L. Grossman, Sexual Harassment in the Post-Weinstein World, 11
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 943 (2021); L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or
a Legal Movement Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321 (2018); Ann C. McGinley,
#MeToo Backlash or Simply Common Sense?: It’s Complicated, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397,
1424 (2020); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Relationships and Retaliation in the #MeToo Era, 72
FLA. L. REV. 797 (2020); Schultz, supra note 12, at 30; Deborah M. Weiss, Sexual Harms
Without Misogyny, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299; Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the
#MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1014 (2018).
14. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583 (2018); Claire A. Hill, #MeToo and the Convergence of CSR and
Profit Maximization, 69 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 895 (2019); Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Private
Misconduct, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 327 (2020); Miazad, Corporate Governance, supra note
4; cf. Michael D. Rebuck, Sexual Misconduct & Securities Disclosures in the “#MeToo”
World, 75 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (2019) (exploring risks of SEC disclosure liability
for failure to disclose instances of high-level sex-based misconduct); Joni Hersch, Efficient
Deterrence of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147 (proposing financial
incentives or damage awards as a method of incentivizing business organizations to eliminate
sexual harassment).
15. A developing literature explores the effects of MeToo on shareholder perception/firm
value. See, e.g., Mary Brooke Billings, April Klein & Yanting Crystal Shi, Investors’
Response to the #MeToo Movement: Does Corporate Culture Matter?, 27 REV. ACCT. STUD.
897 (2022); Karl V. Lins, Lukas Roth, Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, Sexism, Culture, and
Firm Value: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein Scandal and the #MeToo Movement (Eur.
Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Fin.
Working
Paper
No. 679/2020,
2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458312 [https://perma.cc/LL38-VCQR] (finding that returns for
firms with female executives are substantially higher in industries with few women in
executive positions and that perception of a nonsexist culture adds value to firms); Robert
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Responding to their shareholders, previously recalcitrant companies may exercise
greater institutional oversight of sex-based misconduct and strengthen efforts to
achieve gender inclusivity, including within the upper echelons of corporate
leadership.16 In effect, the corporate governance process can buttress
antidiscrimination law, yielding change that could not be achieved through purely
legal channels.
Five years from the onset of MeToo, the time is ripe to test these competing ideas.
We provide an empirically supported and theoretically grounded assessment of the
effects of the MeToo movement on corporate accountability for high-level
harassment. While antidiscrimination scholars have focused primarily on human
resources practices, we explore the role of executive employment contracts. These
generally grant high-level actors expansive job security rights that may constrain a
company’s ability to respond to sex-based misconduct, contributing to the MeToo
accountability problem.17 Recent work proposes that companies should—and in
some cases predict that companies will—revise their drafting practices to reserve
greater discretion to terminate executives engaged in such behavior. 18 Such claims,
however, have not been tested or adequately theorized.19

Mooibroek & Willem F.C. Verschoor, Stock Market Response to CEO Sexual Misconduct:
Evidence from the #MeToo Era (Jan. 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3771575 [https://perma.cc/CX3W-ZRHR] (studying the stock
market response to firms’ sex-based misconduct scandals and the type of firms most prone to
those scandals).
16. Hemel & Lund, supra note 14; Hill, supra note 14; Lin, supra note 14; Miazad,
#MeToo Movement, supra note 4, at 66. But see Stavros Gadinis & Chris Havasy, The Quest
for Legitimacy in Corporate Law (May 6, 2022) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4081543 [https://perma.cc/8JBT-6GBD] (cautioning against
improvident corporate responses to social movements and recommending legitimizing
protocols consistent with public agency procedures). Workplace law scholars have similarly
made predictions of progressive reform within organizations from an antidiscrimination
compliance and institutional response perspective. See Best Practices, supra note 6, at 29–31;
Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229,
278 (2018).
17. See, e.g., Best Practices, supra note 6; Miazad, Corporate Governance, supra note 4;
Tippett, supra note 16, at 278.
18. See supra note 17. Comparable recommendations have been made regarding the use
of “morals clauses” in the entertainment industry. See Rick G. Morris, Media Moguls Risking
It All: Contract Clauses in the Entertainment Business in the Age of #MeToo, 9 ARIZ. ST.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2019); Jihad Sheikha, Punishing Bad Actors: The Expansion of Morals
Clauses in Hollywood Entertainment Contracts in the Wake of the #MeToo Movement, 43
NOVA L. REV. 203, 205 (2019).
19. There is very limited data on corporate policies and drafting practices in the wake of
MeToo. One study finds significant expansion in the length of corporate ethics codes and
increased uses of terms related to issues of corporate social responsibility between 2008 and
2019. Tim Loughran, Bill McDonald & James Otteson, How Have Corporate Codes of Ethics
Responded to an Era of Increased Scrutiny?, J. BUS. ETHICS (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3887743 [https://perma.cc/PXT8-KMYA]. However, that study
does not focus on MeToo or gender equity. A somewhat different project looks at changes to
corporate M&A practices. Anna Windemuth, The #MeToo Movement Migrates to M&A
Boilerplate, 129 YALE L.J. 488 (2019). That study documents the rise of clauses specifically
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We draw on corporate law and agency theory, which assert that the negotiation
and enforcement of CEO contracts is inherently favorable to CEOs, to argue that
dynamics traditionally associated with outsized executive compensation will also
yield overly generous protections against CEO termination.20 We then hypothesize
that the MeToo movement acted as an external shock to these dynamics, spurring
corporations to insist on more pro-company terms that preserve greater discretion to
terminate.21 Finally, we test—and substantiate—both assertions through an empirical
study of CEO contracts before and after the rise of the MeToo movement. We find
statistically significant increases in the inclusion of what we call “MeToo
termination rights”—clauses that grant companies greater flexibility to terminate for
cause in the face of sex-based misconduct. We thus conclude that, post-MeToo,
corporations are positioning themselves to exercise greater oversight of CEO
behavior and respond proactively to sex-based misconduct.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I lays the factual and theoretical
groundwork for our study. Using a case example and drawing on agency theory, we
argue that the MeToo accountability problem owes in part to CEO contract language.
Unlike ordinary employees, CEOs are protected by written contracts that not only
reject the default rule of employment at will22 but contain bespoke provisions that

contemplating a MeToo event but only in the context of corporate transactions. It does not
examine employment contracts.
20. There is an extensive literature arguing that CEOs can extract rents from the
corporation with respect to compensation. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay
Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005); LUCIAN BEBCHUK &
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION (2004). But see M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive
Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 N W. U. L. REV. 1543, 1557 n.74 (2007)
(describing studies purporting to show that CEO compensation is not a product of agency
costs).
21. As we discuss further below, CEO contracts, like other corporate agreements, are at
least partly the product of form documents and are heavily influenced by drafting customs.
Our findings therefore align with other studies that have found path dependence in boilerplate
terms, even in contracts subject to arm’s-length bargaining by sophisticated parties. This
boilerplate can shift in response to shocks to the contracting environment. See Steven M.
Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2009) (documenting the shift
in “material adverse change” clauses in private equity acquisition contracts in response to the
2008 financial crisis); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,
353–55 (1996) (discussing the forces that shape and perpetuate common boilerplate contract
terms).
22. The employment-at-will default rule provides that either party may terminate the
employment relationship for any or no reason. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP. L. § 2.06
(AM. L. INST. 2014). It is generally attributed to an 1877 treatise by Horace Wood and has
been much criticized by employment law scholars from both a historical and policy
perspective. See Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 517 n.1 (2004) (estimating that there are over two hundred articles
advocating for eliminating employment at will in favor of a just cause rule). Regardless of its
desirability or its historical legitimacy, however, employment at will remains the presumptive
rule in every state except Montana, which has modified the default rule by statute. Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2021)
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limit companies’ ability to terminate CEOs without significant financial penalty. 23
This is achieved through narrowly drafted definitions of “cause” that enumerate the
precise and exclusive grounds under which the executive may be terminated without
separation pay. Extant law generally interprets these provisions in favor of CEOs,
making it financially risky for companies to remove CEOs for behavior that, while
wrongful, may ultimately fall short of the contractual standard.24
We then turn from external law to internal norms, examining the nature of
executive contracting within the structure of the corporation. From this perspective,
we consider why companies agree to these generous job security protections—in
effect contracting away their ability to respond nimbly to allegations of sex-based
misconduct. Corporate governance scholars, seeking to explain high executive
compensation packages, have long argued that boards of directors and corporate
executives do not deal at arm’s length.25 However, such theories have not been
applied to other features of executive agreements, such as termination provisions and
definitions of cause. We build on the existing literature, arguing that these same
dynamics can result in pro-CEO definitions of cause that limit board discretion to
discipline CEOs or control misbehavior.
In Part II, we examine these issues empirically. While the principal-agent gap has
been widely theorized, there has been only limited study of the actual terms of CEO
contracts and the extent to which they reflect this governance problem. 26 Similarly,
although several scholars have speculated about the likely effects of the MeToo
movement on corporate decision-making, their predictions have not been tested
empirically.27 We provide the first original study comparing employment agreements
before and after MeToo.
Our results confirm that definitions of cause in CEO contracts generally
enumerate narrow and exclusive grounds for an uncompensated termination (such as
failure to perform and material breach of contract)—terms that, in most cases, do not
embrace sex-based misconduct.28 However, in the wake of the MeToo movement,

(making discharge wrongful if “the discharge was not for good cause”).
23. See infra Part I.A. See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An
Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 233 (2006) (finding in a sample of 375 contracts only twentyfive that “expressly declare the contract to be at-will,” of which only thirteen “give the CEO
the same rights if dismissed with or without cause”).
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 20, at 201 (“The problems of executive
compensation arrangements . . . are rooted in boards’ failure to bargain at arm’s length with
executives.”).
26. A 2006 study examined 375 CEO contracts between 1984 and 2003, but that research
focused on the differences between standard employment contracts and executive contracts.
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 23, at 232.
27. See supra note 14.
28. See infra Part III.C. Of course, sex-based misconduct could rise to the level of a
material breach of contract if it is of sufficient severity or pervasiveness as to implicate
corporate liability. But this is not a certainty. See, e.g., Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 70
N.E.3d 905, 916 (Mass. 2016); Prozinski v. Ne. Real Est. Servs., 797 N.E.2d 415, 423–24
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003); infra Part I.A. For this reason, our focus is on contract language that
more clearly and directly embraces all forms of sex-based misconduct, enabling companies to
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we find evidence that companies increasingly include what we refer to as “MeToo
termination rights.” In particular, we see a higher incidence of termination provisions
that include sexual harassment, discrimination, and violations of company policies
as grounds for cause for termination. Such language embraces sex-based misconduct
explicitly and expansively, strengthening a company’s ability to respond to this
behavior.
In Part III, we analyze our findings from three perspectives: corporate
governance, contract design, and gender equity. Societal expectations about the
seriousness of sex-based misconduct and the need for corporate accountability have
clearly shifted, and our study shows that terms of employment are following. 29 Our
results demonstrate that bargaining dynamics in the corporate context are responsive
to external social change. They also emphasize how contract and governance
intersect to affect organizational behavior. The drafting choices we identify provide
insight into how companies communicate, monitor, and ultimately enforce corporate
values and expectations through contract design. Finally, our results suggest that
companies are anticipating the risk of sex-based misconduct and positioning
themselves to respond. We argue that this change holds promise for safer, more
equitable workplaces where high-level and rank-and-file employees are held to the
same standards of conduct.
In Part IV, we explore the limitations of our findings and highlight areas for
further research. Of course, the changes we identify are on paper—only time will tell
if changes to contract language result in changes to actual behavior. Nor is sex-based
misconduct by CEOs an isolated concern. Much more is at stake in the quest for
gender equity in the world of work than the conduct of individual bad actors. 30 But
the wide space for harassment and related misconduct—previously permitted by
CEO contracts—has become more limited, pushing the acceptable boundaries of
workplace behavior and the norms of executive contracts closer together. We
conclude that these changes, spurred by the viral power of MeToo, represent a
modest victory for the movement.

comfortably terminate the offender without significant fear of a breach of contract claim.
29. See infra Part II.
30. Indeed, employment discrimination scholars caution that focusing on specific
perpetrators can have the adverse effect of diverting attention away from broader cultural
problems within organizations. See, e.g., Claudia Flores, Beyond the Bad Apple—
Transforming the American Workplace for Women After #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85;
Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV.
817, 836–37 (2005); Schultz, supra note 11, at 2103–19; cf. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny,
Sexual Harassment and Solidarity, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 78 (2019) (critiquing
“mainstream media’s systematic focus on sexual harassment as a twisted manifestation of
male sexual desire [that] grabs the headlines, and when the harasser is discharged, the story
ends”). But see Ryan H. Nelson, Workplace Harasser Liability: Assailing Its Moral Hazards
and
Rehabilitating
the
Individualist
Approach,
TENN.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3833129 (arguing for individual harasser liability as
a means of more optimally deterring bad actors).
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I. CONTRACT, GOVERNANCE, AND THE METOO ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM
In the wake of MeToo, a question of central importance is whether the
organizational cultures that tolerated high-level, sex-based misconduct will change
as a result of the movement. Early anecdotal evidence suggests the answer may be
yes. In the two years following the watershed Weinstein revelations, some 200
accused individuals were ousted from positions of power following allegations of
sex-based misconduct. In several instances, accused executives were terminated for
cause or exited without pay.31 Companies proved willing to investigate, publicly
acknowledge the underlying misconduct, and deny severance to the offender.
However, for MeToo to have a lasting effect, companies must act proactively, not
just reactively. In many of the movement’s headline examples—Wynn Resorts,
CBS, and Weinstein Holdings, among others—accountability came only after
decades of reported misconduct.32 A safer, more gender-inclusive workplace
depends on companies responding promptly and proportionately to sex-based
misconduct. It also depends on companies’ willingness to withhold pay and other
benefits when termination is warranted. In several instances, the MeToo movement
revealed that known perpetrators had been allowed to leave companies under
favorable exit terms.33 Such decisions seemingly prioritize the CEO at the expense
of victims and signal corporate ambivalence about the seriousness of sex-based
misconduct.34
However, companies face an important limitation on their ability to respond
appropriately to sex-based misconduct: the content of executive contracts. This Part
explores the relationship between accountability, contract terms, and corporate
governance. It sets up the animating theory of our Article: that companies’ ability to
effectively police high-level, sex-based misconduct is constrained by pro-executive
contract termination provisions. These provisions make it costly for companies to
terminate offenders except (and sometimes even) in the most egregious

31. See, e.g., Elahe Izadi & Travis M. Andrews, Former CBS Chairman Les Moonves
Fired for Cause, Will Not Receive Severance in Wake of Sexual Misconduct Allegations,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
17,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/artsentertainment/2018/12/17/former-cbs-chairman-les-moonves-fired-cause-will-not-receiveseverance-wake-sexual-misconduct-allegations [https://perma.cc/8Z6B-YS2X]; Tiffany Hsu,
Wynn Resorts Will Not Pay Steve Wynn Severance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/business/steve-wynn-severance.html
[https://perma.cc/U2NT-3YLT]; Matthew Townsend, Barnes & Noble Fires Its CEO Without
Severance Pay, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201807-03/barnes-noble-fires-its-ceo-parneros-without-severance-pay [https://perma.cc/T8RM3F8K].
32. See supra note 7.
33. See, e.g., Wakabayashi & Benner, supra note 8; Steel & Schmidt, supra note 8.
34. See Hébert, supra note 13, at 323 (“[T]raditionally, it has been more common for the
targets of sexual harassment, rather than the perpetuators of that harassment, to suffer those
negative employment consequences.”); Michael Z. Green, A New #MeToo Result: Rejecting
Notions of Romantic Consent with Executives, 23 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 115, 147 (2019)
(“When the alleged harasser is a top-level executive, companies try to keep the victim quiet
or retaliate against the victim because the company becomes more concerned about losing
their star and how that loss will affect the company’s prospects.”).
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circumstances. As a result, companies are incentivized to take a “wait-and-see”
approach to sex-based misconduct, allowing the workplace climate to worsen before
taking decisive action.
A. Contract Termination Provisions as Constraints on Responsive Action
There are many reasons why companies might fail to effectively police and
respond to sex-based misconduct in the workplace.35 In ordinary cases, the risk of
legal liability to the accused is not one of them. Most private-sector workers are
employed at will, meaning they can be terminated for any (or no) reason.36 Therefore,
companies are generally not at risk of violating any legal duty to the accused in the
event that they react precipitously or disproportionately to allegations of sex-based
misconduct.37 For a variety of reasons, they may choose to follow internal policies
or practices for investigating and disciplining such behavior. 38 But they are not
legally compelled to do so, nor must they substantiate the underlying allegations or
justify their disciplinary response.39 Moreover, a company’s reasonable concern over

35. These might include an inability to recognize the problem due to lack of facts or
knowledge, a desire to avoid conflict and/or protect the accused, and personal discomfort or
fear of self-incrimination.
36. There is an extensive literature on the development of employment at will, much of it
critical of the doctrine. For a general summary, see Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: ReReforming Employment At-Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2010).
37. See generally Best Practices, supra note 6; Power and Process, supra note 12, at 85.
38. Among other things, employers who investigate complaints of harassment gain a
litigation advantage in the event of subsequent suit by the victim. See Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (recognizing an affirmative defense to hostile workenvironment liability where, inter alia, the employer takes preventative and corrective action
in response to harassment, including through adopting and following antiharassment policies
and investigation protocols); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 779 (1998)
(same). There is an extensive sociological literature exploring how organizations use their
policies and complaint procedures to advance other managerial goals and communicate a
symbolic commitment to workplace equity. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity
and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531,
1567 (1992) (“[W]here legal ambiguity, procedural constraints, and weak enforcement
mechanisms leave the meaning of compliance open to organizational construction,
organizations that are subject to normative pressure from their environment elaborate their
formal structures to create visible symbols of their attention to law.”); Lauren B. Edelman,
Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara‐Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law,
106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1599 (2001) (“[A]s legal ideas move into managerial and organizational
arenas, law tends to become ‘managerialized,’ or progressively infused with managerial
values.”) (emphasis omitted). See generally Schultz, supra note 11, at 2066 (“As sociologists
of law have shown, human resource managers—the inside managers and outside consultants
who specialize in helping organizations handle personnel matters—and management-side
labor lawyers consistently shape understandings of law and compliance with it in a direction
that emphasizes organizational aims, especially efficiency.”).
39. This creates a high risk that an employer will be overly hasty or disproportionate in
its response to allegations of sex-based misconduct levied against rank-and-file employees.
See generally Best Practices, supra note 6, at 14–15 (discussing this problem).
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possible sex-based misconduct would presumably be a legitimate basis for
termination, if one were required. 40
However, the opposite is true when it comes to high-level executives. Almost
universally, these individuals are protected by written employment contracts or
related documents that reject the employment-at-will default.41 Instead, these
agreements are usually structured as fixed-term appointments, guaranteeing the
executive a period of several years of employment. During this term, the company
ostensibly retains a right to terminate at will—it can effect a termination “without
cause”—but only if it pays significant compensation to the separated executive.42
The company avoids those financial consequences only when it terminates for
“cause” as defined in the agreement.43
These definitions usually consist of an enumerated list of precise and exclusive
“grounds” that can support a penalty-free termination.44 As we will see, they tend to
be narrowly drafted in favor of the executive such that ordinary misbehavior—
including some forms of sex-based misconduct—may not suffice.45 This makes it
risky for companies to respond aggressively to “lesser” instances of sex-based
misconduct, such as first offenses or behavior that, while inappropriate, is not
unlawful.46
A widely publicized example illustrates the ways in which such language can
dictate and constrain a company’s response to sex-based misconduct. In November
2019, McDonald’s Corporation fired its CEO, Steve Easterbrook, for having
“demonstrated poor judgment” in connection with a personal relationship. 47 As

40. For instance, where a nonunionized employee enjoys contractual protection against
arbitrary discharge, but not the elaborate protections associated with high-level executive
contracts of the type described below, the majority rule merely requires that the employer have
a reasonable, good faith belief for termination. See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l,
Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 423 (Cal. 1998) (ﬁnding that the jury should consider not whether the
employee actually sexually harassed other employees but whether, at the time of termination,
the decision to terminate his employment was made in good faith by the defendants). In other
words, employers generally do not need to be “right” about the facts in order to lawfully
terminate on the basis of cause. We return to this distinction infra Part III.C.
41. See generally Schwab & Thomas, supra note 23, at 233 (finding no distinction
between consequences of for-cause and no-cause termination in only thirteen out of 375 CEO
contracts).
42. Id. at 251 (finding that two years’ salary is the most common contractual award for
terminations without cause). See generally Best Practices, supra note 6, at 18 (describing these
financial obligations as “a type of liquidated damages clause in the event that the employer
terminates for a non-enumerated reason”).
43. The agreement may refer to “just cause” or “good cause” or simply “cause.” Schwab
& Thomas, supra note 23, at 247, 250.
44. Id. at 248–50.
45. Id. at 249; see infra Part II.
46. See Wexler, Robbennolt & Murphy, supra note 1, at 56 (calling such unwanted sexual
behavior “lawful but awful”).
47. Press Release, McDonald’s Corp., McDonald’s Corporation Announces Leadership
Transition (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/mcdonaldscorporation-announces-leadership-transition-300950405.html
[https://perma.cc/3JCKB5W2]; Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 3.
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reported at the time, Easterbrook engaged in a consensual, nonphysical, but
sexualized relationship with a female subordinate.48 A company investigation
substantiated the misconduct, which Easterbrook acknowledged in a letter to
employees.49 He was initially terminated without cause, resigned from the board of
directors, and received twenty-six weeks’ severance pay amounting to $700,000.50
Subsequent litigation offers a rare look inside the company’s termination
decision. According to court documents, the company’s board of directors, in
determining how to respond to Easterbrook’s misconduct, considered whether it
could terminate him for cause and thereby avoid severance payments.51 The
operative language in the relevant company documents52 defined “cause” as follows:
(a) [an act] involving dishonesty, fraud, illegality, or moral turpitude;
(b) . . . willful, reckless, or material misconduct in the performance of
[the employee’s] duties;
(c) . . . willful or habitual failure to perform or neglect of material duties;
or
(d) . . . serious, reckless or material violation of McDonald’s Standards
of Business Conduct or other employment policies.53

48. David Enrich & Rachel Abrams, McDonald’s Sues Former C.E.O., Accusing Him of
Lying
and
Fraud,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/business/mcdonalds-ceo-steve-easterbrook.html
[https://perma.cc/8VUV-U55M]. In subsequent litigation, McDonald’s described the
relationship as one “involving texting and video calls.” Complaint ¶ 2, McDonald’s Corp. v.
Easterbrook, No. 2020-0658 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2020).
49. Press Release, McDonald’s Corp., supra note 47; Emma Newburger & Amelia Lucas,
McDonald’s Fires CEO Steve Easterbrook for Violating Policy over Relationship with
Employee, CNBC (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/03/mcdonalds-steveeasterbrook-is-out-as-ceo-due-to-a-consensual-relationship-with-an-employee.html
[https://perma.cc/MPS7-P58M].
50. Stephen Gandel, Fired McDonald’s CEO Could See $70 Million Payout After CoWorker Affair, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-easterbrook-firedmcdonalds-ceo-could-see-70-million-payout-after-exit-over-consensual-relationship-with/
[https://perma.cc/EJU8-ULM5] (Nov. 5, 2019, 7:17 PM); Heather Haddon, McDonald’s Fires
CEO Steve Easterbrook over Relationship with Employee, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mcdonalds-fires-ceo-steve-easterbrook-over-relationship-withemployee-11572816660 [https://perma.cc/4DQ9-7TAF].
51. Complaint, supra note 48, ¶¶ 24–25.
52. According to its proxy statements, McDonald’s does not enter into individual
employment agreements but rather applies a uniform contractual policy governing termination
and severance to all of its corporate officers. See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp., Notice of 2015
Annual Shareholders’ Meeting and Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 10, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000119312515125315/d853131ddef14a.ht
m [https://perma.cc/AF6U-5VDT].
53. McDonald’s Corp., McDonald’s Corporation Officer Severance Plan (Form 10-Q), 1
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000006390819000039/mcd3312019xex10q.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5AE-J97D].
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Close examination of this definition reveals why the company chose to terminate
with severance at the time. Easterbrook’s misconduct was not connected with his
work-related duties, as required for a finding of cause under prongs (b) and (c). Since
his inappropriate relationship was consensual, Easterbrook’s misconduct could not
have been categorized as either “moral turpitude” or an “illegal” act under prong (a),
and while a closer fit, it is unlikely that the relationship constituted a policy violation
under (d). Many company policies go beyond prohibitions on sexual and other forms
of discriminatory harassment to preclude consensual workplace relationships.54
However, since Easterbrook’s misconduct involved only phone messages and
videos, not physical intimacy, it presumably did not violate company policy.
Interestingly, subsequent evidence revealed that Easterbrook had in fact
committed more extensive sex-based misconduct in the year preceding his
termination. Several months after Easterbrook’s separation, the company learned
that he engaged in intimate physical relationships with three other employees, one of
whom received a substantial stock grant during the course of their relationship. 55 On
the basis of this information, the company took the rare step of seeking to clawback
Easterbrook’s exit pay. 56 In a suit filed in Delaware Chancery Court, the company
alleged that Easterbrook’s misconduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and that

54. See, e.g., MCDONALD’S, STANDARDS OF BUSINESS CONDUCT 20 (2018),
https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/gwscorp/corporate-governance-content/codesof-conduct/US_English_Sept_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4CW-4NZR] (“[E]mployees who
have a direct or indirect reporting relationship to each other are prohibited from dating or
having a sexual relationship.”). Whether, as a general matter, company antiharassment policies
ought to go beyond unlawful conduct to prohibit consensual relationships is a contested issue
and outside the scope of this Article. Compare Nancy Leong, Them Too, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
941 (2019) (arguing that regardless of consent, intimate relationships involving an institutional
power disparity should be prohibited based on their impact on third parties), with Schultz,
supra note 11, at 2186 (arguing that consensual relationships should be treated like other
nonsexual relationships where management intervenes only when specific organizational
goals are being undermined). See also Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment
from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 34 (2018)
(“[S]weeping prohibitions tend to be unhelpful; they can even hinder the cause of eliminating
harassment and discrimination at work.”). Regardless of the case of high-level employees with
job security, the existence of such a policy enhances the company’s position in arguing that
inappropriate behavior constitutes cause for termination, at least where the executive’s
contractual termination provision references the company’s policies (as in the McDonald’s
example).
55. The company received an anonymous complaint in July 2020, prompting it to open a
second investigation into Easterbrook’s conduct, which confirmed the misconduct. Heather
Haddon, McDonald’s Sues to Recover Severance from Fired CEO, Claiming He Lied About
Affairs
with
Employees,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
10,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mcdonalds-sues-to-recover-severance-from-fired-ceoclaiming-he-lied-about-affairs-with-employees-11597064924
[https://perma.cc/BA6SVRQ6].
56. For other recent examples of companies making use of this tool, see Erika Kelton,
Hertz Makes a Rare Move by Suing Former Executives, FORBES (May 2, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2019/05/02/hertz-makes-a-rare-move-by-suingformer-executives [https://perma.cc/W5U8-UYF8] (noting power of clawback suits and
lamenting their relatively limited use).
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he committed fraud by concealing his behavior during his exit negotiations. 57 The
company contended that it would have fired Easterbrook for cause had it known the
full extent of his misconduct.58
Notwithstanding these additional incidents, however, it remains unclear whether
Easterbrook’s sex-based misconduct constituted cause under the contractual standard
for denying severance. Unlike the nonphysical exchanges uncovered by the
company’s initial investigation, Easterbrook’s conduct doubtlessly violated
McDonald’s antifraternization policy and likely ran afoul of other internal or external
code of conduct rules as well.59 But a policy violation in and of itself would not have
satisfied the relevant definition. To fall within prong (d) of the definition of cause in
Easterbook’s agreement, the violation must be “serious, material, or reckless.”
As our data will demonstrate, this type of “limiting language”—as we refer to it—
is typical of executive contracts.60 Such language qualifies the type of behavior that
constitutes cause for purposes of denying exit pay. It may impose an intent
requirement, set a threshold level of seriousness, require actual harm to the company,
or all three. Thus, in the instant example, Easterbrook might have argued that his
relationships were consensual and did not harm the company, making his misconduct
neither serious, material, nor reckless. McDonald’s, on the other hand, could have
claimed that the behavior was serial and posed a risk of negative publicity and legal
liability. The question is a factual one to be determined based on these and other
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, making the outcome difficult to predict. 61
Ultimately, the parties settled prior to any ruling, so we will never know how a
court would have interpreted Easterbrook’s contract. 62 Tellingly, however,
McDonald’s clawback complaint did not rely solely on the former CEO’s sexual
relationships in alleging cause to terminate. The complaint also pled Easterbrook’s
failure to disclose key facts and his affirmative denial of past relationships during
McDonald’s initial investigation. McDonald’s presumably included these

57. Complaint, supra note 48, ¶¶ 44, 47.
58. Id. ¶ 41.
59. McDonald’s complaint alleges, for instance, that Easterbrook’s approval of a stock
grant in favor of one paramour violated conflict of interest provisions, and that his denial of
past intimate relationships and efforts to conceal them violated his fiduciary duties. Id. ¶¶ 12–
13, 40.
60. See infra Part II.
61. Case law is of little assistance in this regard. Few high-level employment contract
disputes reach litigation, let alone result in a reported decision, and many executive contracts
contain arbitration agreements. Moreover, the termination provisions of the contracts, as well
as the facts of any misconduct, are usually highly particular, yielding nongeneralizable results.
Compare Prozinski v. Ne. Real Est. Servs., 797 N.E.2d 415, 423–24 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)
(finding question of fact presented as to whether executive’s harassment of multiple women,
combined with ﬁnancial mismanagement, constituted material breach of employment
contract) with Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 70 N.E.3d 905, 916 (Mass. 2016) (holding an
employer liable for breach of an executive stock contract despite the executive’s sexual
misconduct where the company failed to provide him notice and an opportunity to cure his
behavior).
62. See Heather Haddon, McDonald’s Settles Lawsuit with Former CEO Steve
Easterbrook, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mcdonalds-settleslawsuit-with-former-ceo-11639659901 [https://perma.cc/GNN7-KDC6].
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allegations in order to lay a factual basis for a finding of cause based on dishonesty
or fraud under prong (a). 63
None of this is to suggest that Easterbrook should or should not have received
severance, or that the court, had it ruled, should have reached a particular conclusion.
The point is that contract language, rather than a straightforward assessment of
culpability, drives the answer to the question. In any situation involving sex-based
misconduct, idiosyncratic facts and circumstances will affect the company’s decision
as to whether termination is warranted and on what terms. This is particularly so in
cases of “lesser” offenses, such as Easterbrook’s consensual (though prohibited)
relationships.64 When dealing with ordinary employees, companies enjoy near total
discretion under the at-will default and are free to take a hard line on all forms of
sex-based misconduct. But when it comes to executives with robust job security
rights, the opposite is true. Companies are likely to err on the side of caution,
particularly in dealing with behavior that falls on or just short of the line, in order to
avoid contract liability to the accused. If the company is especially risk averse, it
may await repeat behavior or especially egregious acts of misconduct before it is
willing to terminate without pay.
Therefore, one proactive measure that companies can take in response to the
MeToo movement is to alter the terms of their executive employment contracts. By
prospectively expanding the definition of cause, companies can obtain increased
flexibility to terminate without pay—or at least credibly threaten to do so—in the
face of sex-based misconduct. Ironically, the definition of cause at issue in the
McDonald’s case is notably more pro-company than many found in high-level
employment contracts. As we discuss in Part III, barely over half of termination
provisions in pre-MeToo CEO contracts included violations of company policy—
what we will refer to later as a “VCP clause”—as grounds for cause.65 Far more
common grounds are, for instance, crimes or illegal acts, under which a company

63. Complaint, supra note 48, ¶¶ 24–25.
64. The MeToo movement implicated a wide range of behavior. See Best Practices, supra
note 6 (providing a taxonomy). Various circumstances—the nature of the conduct, type of
work relationship, degree of power imbalance, degree of gender diversity, and workplace
culture—can appropriately influence companies’ judgments as to what behavior is wrongful,
whether it ought to be prohibited, and what the penalties should be. For our purposes, we
recognize that there is a subset of conduct that—while not unlawful—companies should
prohibit in order to prevent more serious problems. Where that line should be drawn is beyond
the scope of this Article, but we note that arguments for prohibiting consensual workplace
relationships are strongest where they involve workers in disparate positions of power. See
Green, supra note 34 (advocating for a strict “no consent” rule in disputes arising from such
relationships); Leong, supra note 54 (arguing that such relationships should be barred
regardless of consent in the interest of protecting third parties).
65. Moreover, the limiting language in McDonald’s definition is written in the
disjunctive; that is, policy violations will qualify as cause if they are “serious, reckless or
material.” See supra note 53 (emphasis added). That formulation reflects a pro-company
change made in 2019 as compared to the prior version of the governing severance plan that
treated a policy violation as cause to terminate only if “serious and reckless or intentional.”
McDonald’s Corp., McDonald’s Corporation Severance Plan (Form 10-Q) 2 (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000006390815000081/mcd9302015xex10o.htm [https://perma.cc/B83A-9T4P] (emphasis added).
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would need to show that the conduct in question constituted a sex crime or that the
executive’s behavior was egregious enough to meet the narrow legal definition of
sexual harassment.66 The specific contract language that applied to Easterbrook’s
termination was therefore key in enabling McDonald’s to bring suit in an attempt to
hold him accountable for his behavior. If such actions are to become the norm postMeToo, companies must take steps to include more expansive definitions of cause
in executive employment contracts using language that clearly embraces sex-based
misconduct.
B. Corporate Governance and the Negotiation of Executive Employment Contracts
The previous Section illustrated how definitions of cause to terminate affect a
company’s options and bargaining position when faced with an allegation of sexbased misconduct against an incumbent CEO. If this is the case, then changing the
ex ante negotiation of executive contracts is central to addressing the MeToo
accountability problem. It is widely argued, however, that CEOs have excess
bargaining power in negotiating their terms of employment with corporate boards of
directors.67 While such arguments have been used primarily to explain outsized
compensation, CEOs can similarly leverage their power to achieve favorable
termination provisions, including those that protect them when facing accusations of
sex-based misconduct. In this Part, we assess this and competing theories of
corporate bargaining, exploring how those dynamics influence CEO contract terms
and contribute to the MeToo accountability problem.
1. Theories of Executive Compensation
The principal theory that CEOs are able to gain advantageous executive
compensation is known as the managerial power hypothesis.68 A public corporation

66. To demonstrate hostile work-environment liability under federal law, the conduct in
question must be, inter alia, severe or pervasive and objectively offensive. See Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). This high threshold, and other judicially created
limits on employer liability for sexual harassment, have long been the subject of scholarly
criticism. See, e.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S
COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 32–40 (2017) (critiquing such interpretations as
unsupported by statutory text and inappropriately barring recovery for victims); Susan Estrich,
Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 844 (1991) (“Title VII [reaches] only the most extreme
cases of sexual harassment.”). Notably, a few states have rejected the “severe or pervasive”
requirement or otherwise redefined the standard for actionable harassment under state
antidiscrimination law in the wake of the MeToo movement. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
296(1)(h) (West, Westlaw through L.2019 Ch. 360) (effective Nov. 18, 2019) (permitting the
finding of a violation “regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or
pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims”); cf. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923(b)
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 134 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (providing that a “single incident of
harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work
environment”).
67. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 20 (arguing that executive compensation
is a product of undue executive influence resulting in excess compensation).
68. See Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28
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is governed by a board of directors that is elected by shareholders.69 The
shareholders, however, have limited ability to monitor these director-agents. This
principal-agent problem in corporate operations enables rent seeking by CEOs who
can leverage their position vis-à-vis the board to reap private gains through more
favorable compensation terms.70
In the context of CEO compensation, an agency problem arises because
executives bargain for themselves while directors bargain on behalf of the
corporation. But director-agents do not internalize the costs of this bargaining, which
are instead borne by the company.71 This creates unequal incentives between the
executive and directors that the executive can exploit to obtain an advantageous
compensation package. This situation is exacerbated by a second agency problem:
since the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the corporation,
directors will be loath to make this executive unhappy.
The managerial power hypothesis thus posits that executives use their leverage to
negotiate pay packages that are not fully aligned with performance. 72 Ordinarily, one
would expect pay packages to be sensitive to the CEO’s success or failure in
operating the corporation. Instead, CEOs receive what has been termed “pay without
performance”—compensation that is neither market based nor the product of arm’slength bargaining but is instead biased in favor of the executive.73
This phenomenon has been explored most prominently by Professors Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. In their book Pay Without Performance, the two argue that
directors are incentivized to acquiesce to compensation packages that pay excess
compensation to executives.74 Their arguments follow another premise of principalagent theory: directors—who have their own incentives to remain on the board—are
often chosen with the consent of the CEO and therefore are prone to cater to that
CEO.75 Bebchuk and Fried also argue that the inherent group dynamics among the
board and management make directors loyal to management and want to win
executives’ allegiance by consenting to exorbitant pay packages.76 Bebchuk and
Fried extensively document this effect through examples of excess pay to executives
with records of poor performance. 77

CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2032–33 (2007).
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors . . . .”).
70. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 20, at 62. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (theorizing
that the separation of ownership and control in the corporation results in undue agency costs).
71. See generally Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1382, 1405–07 (1992) (discussing the incentives of agents).
72. See generally Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 227–28 (1990).
73. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 20.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 25–31.
76. Id. at 31–37.
77. See id. at 9.
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There is a countervailing thesis: the optimal contracting theory. 78 This theory
posits that compensation is designed to incentivize executives and that the resulting
arrangements are in fact the product of arm’s-length bargaining based on market
forces.79 As with the managerial power theory, there is some evidence to support the
optimal contracting theory.80
First, in private corporations—where shareholders are able to better monitor the
CEO—CEOs enjoy similar, if not higher, pay.81 Second, the tenure of CEOs is
short—approximately six years on average for the S&P 500.82 What Bebchuk and
Fried view as excess compensation might instead be justified as an incentive to
perform during this short period, and thus a result of optimal contracting. 83 Finally,
there is evidence that responses to criticism of CEO pay have pushed compensation
packages to be more performance-driven (for example, by increasing the proportion
of compensation that comes in the form of stock options and awards).84 The shift
toward stock options may result in extremely high payouts as the stock market rises.
This results in a skewed distribution of compensation, and the pay packages which
Bebchuk and Fried report may be marginal cases that are the inherent by-products of
any incentive-based system.
Our data provide some evidence that CEOs enjoy significant bargaining power.85
But for purposes of this Article, we do not need to resolve this debate. We focus on
whether MeToo changed the outcome of executive contract negotiation on
termination provisions, regardless of which theory best explains the baseline

78. See Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 134, 135 (1973); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who
Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1620–24 (2005) (book review) (reviewing the optimal
contracting theory).
79. See generally John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. R EV. 1142, 1160 (2005)
(book review).
80. Id. at 1160–67.
81. See David I. Walker, Executive Pay Lessons from Private Equity, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1209 (2011).
82. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1031
(2010).
83. This line of scholarship builds on foundational work on the agency costs of the firm.
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976); Iman
Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J.
1557 (2005) (arguing that executive pay is a tournament model designed to motivate and
reward employees).
84. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 49, 51 (2003); Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate
Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1888 (2001); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive
Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2525 (Orley Ashenfelter & David
Card eds., 1999).
85. We confirm that CEOs almost universally enjoy extremely robust job security
protection, although we do not explore why that occurs.
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dynamic.86 The competing arguments about executive power, however, are
fundamental to understanding the tensions and corporate governance issues that
underlie the negotiation of CEO employment contracts.
2. Nonprice Contract Terms and the Agency Problem
These two contending theories of executive compensation can be applied to the
negotiation of other terms of CEO employment contracts. If the managerial-power
hypothesis holds, then termination provisions and other contractual terms of
employment can suffer from the same pathologies as compensation. CEO contracts
are ostensibly negotiated between the board and the CEO, but because the board does
not bear the costs of enforcement of the contract—which instead fall on the
company—the board may again fail to internalize the costs of these contract terms.
The CEOs can therefore leverage their position to obtain preferential terms of
employment in addition to compensation.
Indeed, this problem could be exacerbated in the case of nonprice terms of CEO
employment agreements that, unlike compensation, are not subject to special review.
CEO compensation must be disclosed in a company’s proxy statement,87 and
requires the approval of shareholders in a nonbinding “say-on-pay” vote every one
to three years.88 When assessing how to vote, institutional shareholders have
discussions with the compensation committee of the board, and proxy advisory
services make recommendations as to precatory approval of this compensation.89
This disclosure and review process could potentially provide a soft check on
managerial compensation and help to minimize any principal-agent conflicts by
imposing outside pressures from shareholders and proxy advisory services.
But there is no equivalent process for contract terms beyond compensation.
Shareholders and other interested parties have the ability to access and review
contract content. CEO contracts are publicly available because executive
employment agreements are material documents that must be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).90 But there is no organized scrutiny of
these terms and no formal process by which shareholders can assess or disapprove
them. Thus, if the managerial power theory is correct, executives should be able to
assert even greater bargaining power over the nonprice terms of their employment
contracts than they can over actual compensation.
The negotiation of the terms of employment may also be biased by other unique
contractual bargaining factors. The first is cognitive bias: the exact amount of

86. Notably in the executive compensation literature, some have argued that even if
optimal contract theory holds, regulation of CEO pay may be justified. See Randall S. Thomas
& Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal
Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846 (2011).
87. See Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
599 (2013).
88. See Executive Compensation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answers-execomphtm.html [https://perma.cc/Y7M6-58F9].
89. See Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About
Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101 (2018).
90. 107 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(iii) (2020).
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compensation is an immediate factor in a negotiation.91 But the enforcement terms
of a contract are relevant at a future date, if ever. Corporate agents may fail to
vigorously negotiate (or even contemplate) contract terms that may only be triggered
in the distant future.92 This allows the CEO to obtain a contractual advantage by
bargaining for termination provisions that may prove overly favorable to the
executive but pose no immediate cost to the corporation.93
Finally, in negotiating complex contracts, parties often rely on a form that
contains standard language. As we see in the next Part, some aspects of CEO
contracts follow a similar pattern. The definition of cause to terminate in such
agreements is often comprised of standard categories of wrongdoing. If this preexisting language is beneficial to CEOs, there will be incentives within the
bargaining dynamic to keep it.94 A departure from the usual drafting practices is
unlikely to occur absent a shock to the system—something that would move the
parties from the path dependency of the contracting process.95 Thus, even if some
CEOs do not have power in a specific instance, they may benefit from a set of overall
bargaining dynamics that provide them favorable terms. 96 But these are all theories.
In the next Part, we turn to an empirical assessment of CEO contract terms and
companies’ response to the MeToo movement.
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Study Design
Our empirical approach takes advantage of the availability of public companies’
executive employment agreements, which are material documents that are required
to be filed with the SEC. 97 We gather six years of contracts and code by hand the
inclusion of various grounds for cause for termination. Our particular focus is on the
incidence of those grounds that might plausibly cover sex-based misconduct: (1)
harassment or discrimination; (2) violations of company policy or codes of conduct;

91. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051,
1084–1102 (2002) (describing various cognitive biases and heuristics, including confirmatory
bias, probability bias, and overconfidences).
92. See id. at 1119–24 (discussing inconsistencies in the way individuals value present
and future events).
93. This may have been a factor in the infamous Disney case in which former CEO
Michael Ovitz was able to reap a $130 million windfall pay package—payable from the start
date of his employment—if he was terminated at any time without cause. See generally JAMES
STEWART, DISNEYW AR (2005); Kenneth M. Rosen, Mickey, Can You Spare a Dime?
DisneyWar, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Business Law Pedagogy,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1151 (2007).
94. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).
95. See Davidoff, supra note 21 (detailing the theory that external shocks engender
changes to boilerplate contract language).
96. See Russell B. Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998).
97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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(3) general misconduct; and (4) moral turpitude. We refer to these collectively as
“MeToo termination rights,” although we focus specifically on the first two grounds,
as discussed below.
To assess the effect of MeToo, we adopt a quasi-experimental before/after design
in which we compare the set of contracts signed by companies before MeToo to the
set of those signed after. As a dividing line, we split the sample after the fourth
quarter of 2017—the quarter in which the Harvey Weinstein revelations were made
public.98 We consider all contracts signed between January 2015 and December 2017
to be “pre-MeToo,” and all contracts signed between January 2018 and December
2020 to be “post-MeToo.”99
Ideally, we would compare the employment agreements of companies that were
affected by MeToo to those that were not exposed. 100 However, because the rise of
MeToo affected all U.S. corporations at the same time, there is no set of unaffected
companies that can serve as a control group. 101 Instead, in order to attribute any
differences to the impact of MeToo, our before-and-after approach relies on an
important assumption: that contracting practices relating to termination clauses were
constant and would not have changed if not for MeToo. Although this is a strong—
and untestable—assumption, it is very credible in this case, for several reasons.
First, we choose a deliberately short study window—three years before and three
years after MeToo—to minimize the risk of capturing variation caused by other,
unrelated factors. Second, the Weinstein revelation (our “treatment” event) was
unexpected, limiting the risk that companies might have adjusted their behavior in
anticipation of the MeToo movement. In its wake, the movement became a viral
phenomenon remarkably quickly.
Finally, and most importantly, the data bear out our assumption of general stasis
in two ways. First, we find that inclusions of sexual harassment and discrimination
as grounds for cause are essentially constant in the pre-MeToo period—in other
words, the pre-trend is flat. Second, between the pre- and post-MeToo periods, we

98. See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1; Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to
Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assaultharvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https://perma.cc/ZRN6-5R5E].
99. Of course, the wider “Me Too” movement has a much longer history—the phrase was
first coined by Tarana Burke in 2006. See Abby Ohlheiser, The Woman Behind ‘Me Too’
Knew the Power of the Phrase When She Created It — 10 Years Ago, WASH. POST (Oct. 19,
2017, 8:38 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/10/19/thewoman-behind-me-too-knew-the-power-of-the-phrase-when-she-created-it-10-years-ago
[https://perma.cc/M4PV-3QVR]; supra note 1. However, it was not until late 2017 that the
movement became a viral, mainstream phenomenon and so, for our purposes, we consider this
to be the beginning of the movement writ large.
100. This approach is known as a “difference-in-differences” design. See, e.g., Jonah B.
Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 29 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (discussing various quasi-experimental
empirical designs). The empirical design that we adopt is closest in spirit to the before-andafter time series approach that the authors discuss in section 3.5.1. Id. at 51–53.
101. Nor can we rely on panel data—that is, repeated observations of the same firm—
because the vast majority of companies signed only one new CEO contract during our study
window.
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find no change in the incidence of grounds that are not related to sex-based
misconduct, in keeping with our prior sense that there is a significant degree of stasis
and path dependency in these contracts. In Part III.C, infra, we discuss these results
in greater detail, but first we turn to data collection.
B. Data and Coding
Our sampling frame comprises CEOs from every company listed in the S&P 1500
composite index.102 We began by obtaining a list of every CEO whose employment
commenced between January 2015 and December 2020. Our primary source for
CEO transitions was Compustat’s Execucomp database, which tracks executive
compensation on an annual basis.103 However, because Execucomp harvests its data
from annual proxy statements—which lag new appointments by up to a year—we
found its coverage of 2020 to be significantly truncated. To correct this, we
supplemented our list with executive data from BoardEx,104 which added a further
thirty-seven new CEOs to our list.
Using this list of CEOs, we searched the SEC’s EDGAR 105 website for
employment agreements, severance agreements, or offer letters pertaining to each
executive. In many cases, a full-text search was enough to locate the agreement; in
others, we checked the annual (10-K), quarterly (10-Q), and 8-K reports for the year
surrounding the CEO’s appointment. In total, we located 638 agreements, relating to
620 individuals at 518 companies. Table 1 shows, for each year, the number of CEOs
and number of contracts that we located.106

102. The S&P 1500, or Standard & Poor’s Composite 1500 Index, is a marketcapitalization-weighted index of 1500 of the largest (by market capitalization) publicly traded
companies in the United States. The composite index is composed of three constituent indices:
the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600.
103. See Compustat Execucomp: The Basics, WHARTON RSCH. DATA SERVS., https://wrdswww.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/grid-items/compustat-execucomp-basics
[https://perma.cc/PNL7-9LY8].
104. See
BoardEx,
WHARTON
RSCH.
DATA
SERVS.,
https://wrdswww.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/about/data-vendors/boardex [https://perma.cc/8EAT-SLFG].
105. EDGAR—or the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system—is the
primary system by which companies file legally required information with the SEC. Filings
& Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar [https://perma.cc/B6S64XJW].
106. Even with the additional data, there is still a notable decline in the number of CEO
transitions in 2020, which appears to be a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g.,
Cathy Anterasian, Courtney della Cava, Claudius Hildebrand & Dale Cottrell, Crisis Put CEO
Successions on Hold in 2020. Expect a Rebound in 2021., SPENCERSTUART (Feb. 2021),
https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/crisis-put-ceo-successions-on-hold-in2020 [https://perma.cc/H3K4-5NSM].
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Table 1: New S&P 1500 CEOs by year of hire, 2015–2020
2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

New CEOs

193

183

177

184

206

163

Located contracts

101

93

117

114

124

89

Our sample of contracts covers fifty-seven percent of the CEOs who were hired
during our study window. There are a few reasons for this. First, some of the
executives in our list are interim CEOs, who are generally (though not always)
appointed without a formal agreement.107 Second, some companies do not sign
individual agreements with executive officers: a CEO may instead be governed by a
more general executive severance plan or be a true at-will employee.108 Finally, we
suspect that a small minority of companies fail to file extant agreements despite SEC
requirements.109 Nevertheless, our sample is sufficiently large and has representative
coverage across time (Table 1, above) and market index (Table 2, below).
With the located agreements in hand, we manually reviewed each contract. Where
we found a definition of cause for termination, we coded the individual grounds
according to a codebook that we specified in advance.110 Of the agreements that we
obtained, seventy-four percent contain an explicit definition of cause, either in the
termination provisions themselves or elsewhere in the contract—for example, in an
Appendix. Of the remaining twenty-six percent of contracts, the majority refer to
terms or definitions that are contained elsewhere—for example, in company
handbooks and policies, or more general executive severance plans. Consistent with
prior research, only a handful of the contracts are true “at-will” agreements, which
allow the CEO to be terminated at any time without financial penalty to the
company.111 We also encountered a handful of amendments to employment
agreements, and we included these in our analysis if they contained definitions of
cause.112

107. Typically, an interim CEO is an internal appointment who continues to be governed
by the terms of the employment agreement (if any) from their prior role.
108. Such is the case with McDonald’s CEO Steve Easterbrook, as discussed previously.
See supra Part I.A. Because we could not reliably obtain general severance policies or
corporate handbooks for every company, we elected only to code termination provisions that
we found on the face of the contract.
109. This is in line with previous findings in the literature. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara,
Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses
and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2015); Stuart
L. Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell & Robert Parrino, Explicit Versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from
CEO Employment Agreements, 64 J. FIN. 1629 (2009). Of course, it may also be that we
missed some contracts. Although we took care to be inclusive, no data collection strategy is
foolproof.
110. We discuss the specific grounds in greater detail below. The codebook, and our full
data, will be available at http://www.jameshicks.io.
111. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 23, at 248–49.
112. Amendments and renewals are most commonly used to extend the term of the initial
agreement or to adjust the executive’s compensation package (for example, with a stock
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Table 2 provides a breakdown of our data across the three S&P indices in the
sample. The three rows show the number of CEOs; the number of employment
agreements that we located; and finally, the number of located agreements that
contain termination provisions.
Table 2: CEO employment agreement data by S&P index, 2015–2020
S&P 500

MidCap
400

SmallCap
600

Total

Newly hired CEOs

393

272

441

1106

Located contracts

190

155

293

638

Contracts containing
termination provisions

131

115

235

481

C. What Happened in the Wake of MeToo?
Table 3 presents our main results: the difference in the incidence of various
grounds for cause before and after MeToo. For comparison purposes, Table 3 also
includes a column showing the results from a 2006 study by Professors Stewart
Schwab and Randall Thomas—to our knowledge, the only previous comprehensive
study of the termination clauses in CEO contracts. 113 Those authors collected a set
of agreements from S&P 1500 CEOs who were employed in 1999, with the bulk of
their agreements signed between 1996 and 2000. Their data offer a snapshot of
contract terms during that period, though they do not draw explicit comparisons over
time.114
In the first four rows, we highlight the four grounds that we characterize as
comprising “MeToo termination rights.” Our main results provide strong support for
the hypothesis that post-MeToo companies anticipate the risk of a MeToo-type event
and specifically reserve power to terminate without pay in those circumstances. We
observe statistically significant shifts in the incidence of contracts containing two of
the four grounds for cause that relate to sex-based misconduct—and, importantly,
relative stasis in other areas.
Explicit inclusions of harassment or discrimination as grounds for cause increase
by more than eleven percentage points in the post-MeToo period, from 3.9% to
15.2%. Notably, such grounds for cause have traditionally been extremely rare.
Schwab and Thomas found only two mentions of harassment in their sample of 375
contracts. Despite a modest increase by the pre-MeToo period of our study window,
fifteen years later, we find that significant change only begins in the wake of MeToo.

award).
113. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 23, at 249.
114. Given the focus of our study, we captured slightly different variables than those
authors, but what comparisons we have are illuminating. Interestingly, the incidence of
termination provisions that include moral turpitude and breach of fiduciary duty have fallen
sharply in the last two decades.
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Similarly, the incidence of company policy violations as grounds for cause increases
by around fourteen percentage points, from 53% to 67%.
On the other hand, we observe no change in the rate of “general misconduct” or
“moral turpitude” clauses. Given the premise of our study, this is unsurprising. As
previously discussed, these two grounds may encompass some forms of sex-based
misconduct, but judging from past practice and judicial interpretation, they are not
adequate to capture the full range of MeToo-type behavior.115 Notably, the baseline
rate for general misconduct was already very high, at nearly eighty percent. This is
unsurprising given the wide variety of wrongful behaviors other than sex-based
misconduct that could foreseeably justify a for-cause termination. What we expected
was to see companies moving beyond existing drafting practices to anticipate
specifically sex-based misconduct, and to reserve the flexibility to respond
proactively to “lesser” forms of such behavior. And, indeed, this is what we find:
among all grounds, only harassment and policy violations show statistically
significant differences at conventional levels.
Table 3: Incidence of select grounds for a for-cause termination in S&P 1500 CEO
employment agreements
Schwab & Thomas
study (1996–2000)

Current study (2015–2020)
PreMeToo

PostMeToo

p

0.5%

4%

15%

0.00

—

53%

67%

0.00

Misconduct

69.1%

79%

78%

0.83

Moral turpitude

72.9%

45%

45%

0.93

Illegal, unlawful, or
criminal act

—

95%

95%

0.84

Limited to felony

—

71%

70%

0.84

Failure to perform

57.9%

82%

86%

0.22

Breach of fiduciary duty

50.7%

27%

26%

0.83

Fraud or deceit

—

79%

78%

0.74

Breach of contract

—

70%

63%

0.10

Number of agreements

375

238

243

—

Grounds
Harassment or
discrimination
Violation of company
policy or code of conduct

Note: In the current study, the “pre-MeToo” contracts were executed between 2015 and 2017;
“post-MeToo” contracts were executed between 2018 and 2020. In the Schwab & Thomas

115. See supra Part I.A (discussing the example of CEO Steve Easterbrook).
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study, the majority of agreements were executed between 1996 and 2000.116 Two-sided pvalues are from Fisher’s exact test of independence.

Next, we consider whether our results might be partly driven by some other
characteristic of the firm, such as corporate governance, rather than the MeToo
movement. For instance, a corporate board with a high proportion of independent
directors might be expected to provide more robust oversight of the company’s
managers. In Table 4, we show the results of a set of regression models that add a set
of firm-level controls to our basic model. In each case, we estimate a version of:
𝑦𝑦ijt = 𝛽𝛽 1(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜i ) + 𝜸𝜸𝜸𝜸jt + ϵijt .

In this specification, the outcome 𝑦𝑦ijt is a binary indicator, which is equal to 1 if
contract i (with firm j at time t) contains a harassment or discrimination clause, and
0 otherwise. 1(MeTooi) is a binary indicator that is equal to 1 if the contract is signed
in the post-MeToo period, and 0 otherwise. 𝑿𝑿jt are various firm-level controls,
including industry and S&P index fixed effects (note that these controls vary over
time for companies that sign multiple contracts). ϵijt is the usual error term. The
coefficient 𝛽𝛽 captures the effect of MeToo.
Model 1 includes the fraction of independent directors on the board, as a proxy
for executive capture of the board. In Model 2, we add a control for industry. 117
Finally, in Model 3, we include the “e-index,” a commonly used measure of firmlevel management entrenchment that runs from 0 to 6 (where 6 indicates the highest
level of entrenchment).118 Each model also includes S&P index fixed effects to
control for the size and prominence of the company.
The post-MeToo effect continues to stand out in both substantive and statistical
terms, closely matching the results above. Across all three models, post-MeToo
contracts are eleven to twelve percent more likely to include sexual harassment or
discrimination as grounds for cause, regardless of the control. The inclusion of firm
controls and governance characteristics has no impact on the main results.

116. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 23, at 245.
117. We control for industry using fixed effects at the two-digit “standard industry
classification” (SIC) level. See Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC Code), LIBR. OF
CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/industry-research/classification-sic [https://perma.cc/LX8TKFR8].
118. The entrenchment index is a simple summation of six indicators for limits to
shareholder amendment of: (1) the bylaws; (2) the charter; (3) a supermajority voting
requirement for any merger; (4) a classified board; (5) a poison pill; and (6) golden parachutes
for senior executives. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009). The accuracy and reliability of
governance indices are somewhat controversial. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction
in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1363–68 (2013); Jens
Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili & Eric Talley, Cleaning Corporate Governance, 170
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2021). We take no position on those questions here and include the index
only to show that our main results are unchanged.
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Table 4: Linear regression showing the relationship between presence of a
harassment or discrimination clause and MeToo, controlling for firm and
governance characteristics
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.124***
(0.027)

0.116***
(0.027)

0.115***
(0.027)

-0.192
(0.15)

-0.352
(0.187)

—

Entrenchment
index (0–6)

—

—

0.012
(0.02)

S&P index fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed
effects

No

Yes

Yes

Observations

473

463

464

Adjusted R2

0.05

0.21

0.20

Post-MeToo?
(0/1)
Proportion of the
board that is
independent (0–1)

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for the presence of a contractual ground for a forcause termination in the event of harassment or discrimination. Results are from a linear
probability model (ordinary least squares with binary outcomes) using standard errors
clustered at the company level. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are
two-digit SIC codes. We could not locate up-to-date governance and industry data for ten
companies, and they are excluded here.

One limitation of a before/after framework is its potential to mask important
changes over time. The various estimates above reflect the difference between the
average incidences in the pre- and post-MeToo periods. However, it is reasonable to
suppose that the effect of MeToo would take some time to mature, in part due to the
path dependence of executive contracting. To explore the underlying trends, we bin
the contracts into quarters and plot the fraction of contracts in each quarter that
include harassment or discrimination as grounds for cause.
As Figure 1 shows, the trend in the pre-MeToo period is flat and low: harassment
clauses were simply not a significant feature of CEO contracts before MeToo.119
However, in the three years after the Weinstein revelations, we observe a sharp

119. As previously discussed, this constant trend in the pre-period also lends support to
our assumption that the incidence of harassment clauses would have remained steady in the
counterfactual world without MeToo.
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change: a growing trend in contractual language that targets harassment. In the third
quarter of 2020, nearly forty percent of contracts included a sexual harassment
clause. Clearly, the increase in averages post-MeToo tells only part of the story; the
underlying trend indicates that harassment clauses are becoming more prevalent over
time. We are hesitant to extrapolate this trend too far into the future—it may be that
the incidence of these clauses will reach a natural ceiling—but in Parts IV and V, we
discuss the potential implications of the changes that we are already witnessing.

Percent of agreements with harassment provision

Figure 1: Fraction of contracts that include harassment or discrimination as
grounds for cause in CEO employment agreements
40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
Q1 2015

Q1 2016

Q1 2017

Q1 2018

Q1 2019

Q1 2020

Quarter

Note: Solid lines are interrupted time series regressions.

D. Limiting Language and Procedural Protections
Finally, we consider several ways in which the apparent rise in “MeToo
termination rights” might be undermined elsewhere in the parties’ contract. Thus far
we see evidence that companies are more frequently insisting on grounds for cause
that permit termination in the event of sex-based misconduct on the part of CEOs.
However, there remain contractual mechanisms through which CEOs might protect
themselves, notwithstanding these more capacious definitions of cause.120 These
include what we refer to as “limiting language” and “procedural protections.”
As noted in Part I, for-cause grounds are often qualified by a threshold level of
intent, seriousness, or harm to the company that must be met for the grounds to be
satisfied.121 Limiting language of this sort can reduce the scope of any particular

120. See supra Part I.A (describing Easterbrook’s contract); Hemel & Lund, supra note
14, at 1647 (describing Weinstein’s contract).
121. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. For an example of limiting language that
includes both intent and seriousness, consider the previously discussed clause from the
McDonald’s executive severance plan. The plan defines “cause” as: “willful, reckless, or
material misconduct in the performance of [the employee’s] duties.” McDonald’s Corporation
Officer Severance Plan, supra note 53 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
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ground for cause, constraining the company’s ability to respond to bad acts. The
increase in explicit sexual harassment and discrimination grounds is particularly
noteworthy because, unlike other grounds for cause, these do not generally appear
with any kind of qualification. In Table 5, we show the incidence of limiting
language for two other grounds for cause that relate to sex-based misconduct:
violations of company policy (or codes of conduct) and general misconduct.
As Table 5 indicates, limiting language is common with respect to both these
grounds. In most contracts, violations of company policy and general misconduct
include some kind of seriousness threshold, and general misconduct commonly also
includes requirements of CEO intent and actual harm to the company. Overall, we
find very little change between the two periods in our study. Only one instance is
statistically significant—the seriousness requirement for policy violations—and the
change is in the “pro-company” direction (in the sense that fewer termination
provisions are subject to a heightened threshold in the post-MeToo period).122 Thus,
while we have some concern about the practical scope of the “MeToo termination
rights” where limiting language is present, the relative stasis in such language does
not undermine our conclusion that companies are reserving greater discretion to
terminate CEOs for sex-based misconduct.
Table 5: Incidence of limiting language on grounds for cause in CEO employment
agreements
PreMeToo

PostMeToo

p

238

243

—

n = 127

163

—

Intent

39%

29%

0.11

Seriousness

73%

62%

0.05

Harm

14%

16%

0.74

Misconduct

188

189

—

Intent

77%

71%

0.24

Seriousness

54%

54%

1

Harm

61%

65%

0.46

Total contracts
Violation of company policy or code of
conduct

Note: Two-sided p-values are from Fisher’s exact test of independence.

122. On the other hand, the underlying data suggest that the prevalence of each example
of limiting language is quite variable from year-to-year, in keeping with our finding that there
are few clear changes.
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Another common pro-CEO feature of termination provisions is what we refer to
as “procedural protections.” These are essentially CEO due process rights, which
govern the way a company can exercise its for-cause termination rights. These
protections are intended to ensure that board members do not invoke grounds for
cause pretextually or without sufficient evidence. We hypothesized that if CEOs
were willing to accept wider latitude for for-cause terminations, they might demand
stronger procedural protections in exchange.
Table 6 shows the incidence of five of the most common types of protection: a
written description of the offending conduct; an opportunity to cure the offending
behavior; an opportunity to be heard; a supermajority vote of the board; and good
faith on the part of the board. Most contracts require the board to give the CEO a
written description of the offending conduct and to provide the CEO an opportunity
to cure the offending behavior. However, other substantive protections are rare. In
general—and contrary to our expectations—we find no evidence that procedural
protections are on the rise in CEO agreements post-MeToo. There are few
substantive changes, and none are statistically significant. This is especially notable
given the fears expressed by some MeToo critics about a rush to judgment based on
mere allegations and limited proof.123 At least on the strength of this evidence, it does
not appear that “MeToo termination rights” are being undermined by more expansive
procedural protections.
Table 6: Procedural protections against termination in CEO agreements
Protection

Pre-MeToo

Post-MeToo

p

Written description

79%

77%

0.66

Opportunity to cure

72%

67%

0.23

Opportunity to be heard

23%

18%

0.21

Board must behave in
good faith

30%

23%

0.10

Supermajority board
vote

13%

10%

0.31

Note: Two-sided p-values are from Fisher’s exact test of independence.

123. See Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37, 38 (describing
backlash against the movement grounded in due process concerns); Rhode, supra note 9, at
411–17 (same).
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III. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR EXECUTIVE CONTRACTING AND WORKPLACE
NORMS?
In this Part, we analyze our findings from three perspectives: corporate
governance, contract design, and gender equity. First, our empirical findings are
largely in line with the managerial power theory and offer insight into what
circumstances will drive corporate boards to break established bargaining patterns.
Second, they illustrate the range of drafting choices that companies face when
anticipating CEO misconduct and suggest possible tradeoffs that companies might
make when crafting “MeToo termination rights.” Finally, our findings allow us to
imagine various ways in which changes in contract language can positively impact
gender equity goals. “MeToo termination rights” may have signaling value at the
point of hire, deterrent effects over the course of the relationship, and influence on
the terms of CEO exit if and when the executive engages in sex-based misconduct.
Including these grounds for cause also has symbolic value insofar as they incorporate
existing company policies, effectively making the CEO abide by the same rules as
the workforce at large.
A. Implications for the Principal-Agent Problem
The shifts in contract language that we document provide evidence of the agency
issues highlighted in Part I. As we discussed, corporate governance theory predicts
that CEO contracts may not be market-based deals because unique bargaining
dynamics enable the executive to extract rents in contract negotiations.124
Consequently, CEO contract terms may be more favorable to the executive than
would be expected under ordinary market conditions, resulting in greater
compensation and less performance accountability. Our research augments this
theoretical account in several ways.
First, our pre-MeToo results are in accord with the principal-agent theory,
providing evidence of contract exit terms that are highly favorable to CEOs. In all of
the contracts in our sample, we observe narrowly enumerated grounds for cause that
do not capture the full range of behaviors that would justify termination under
general contract law. For example, more than eighty percent of contracts both before
and after MeToo list “failure to perform” as grounds for cause. 125 This phrasing is
generally interpreted by courts to mean a failure so fundamental that it materially
breaches the contract.126 As previously discussed, when courts interpret general job

124. See supra Part I.
125. See supra Part II.
126. See, e.g., Bolander v. Bolander, 703 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (contrasting
failure to perform constituting a material breach of contract with mere poor performance that
did not constitute cause for termination of executive’s employment contract). Furthermore,
many contracts further qualify “failure to perform” with limiting language. We did not collect
data on this point because we focused on grounds that either explicitly addressed or could be
interpreted to capture sex-based misconduct. However, for an example, see discussion of
Easterbrook’s contract, supra notes 47–63 and accompanying text (including “willful or
habitual failure to perform” as grounds for cause).
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security contracts that do not define cause, they interpret cause to mean any
reasonable, good-faith basis for termination.127 This would include mere
dissatisfaction with performance if objectively based and asserted in good faith. 128
For the same reasons, typical executive contracts that define cause narrowly (and
lack “MeToo termination rights”) leave space for CEOs to engage in some forms of
sex-based misconduct. The more common grounds for cause may capture some of
this behavior, but they are less capacious. CEO contracts that include criminal
behavior, for instance, would presumably capture acts of sexual assault, but not civil
sexual harassment. Those that include “moral turpitude” might capture some forms
of noncriminal sexual harassment, but probably would not apply to gender-based
harassment that is nonsexual in nature. Generic “misconduct” would appear to
capture all of these behaviors, but as discussed in Part II, CEO contracts often qualify
that term with limiting language. Our data show that over ninety percent of contracts
that list “misconduct” as grounds for cause pair that term with one or more threshold
levels of intent, seriousness, or harmfulness that narrow the scope of actionable
behavior. Thus, contracts that lack explicit “MeToo termination rights” generally
give companies the clear right to terminate executives for cause only when sex-based
misconduct has already done harm or placed the company at risk of liability. In such
contracts, companies have effectively negotiated away their ability to act
preventatively in anticipation of these harms.
Yet our post-MeToo results show that companies can and will bridge this apparent
principal-agent gap in response to external pressures. There are at least three
dimensions to this shift with implications for corporate governance. First, companies
are clearly claiming more at the bargaining table, directly responding to gaps in CEO
contracts brought to light by the MeToo movement. By negotiating for the explicit
inclusion of discrimination or harassment and violations of company policy in the
definition of cause, companies are insisting on greater power to terminate and at the
same time sending a clear signal to CEOs from the moment of hire that sex-based
misconduct will not be tolerated.
Second, companies are laying the groundwork to legally terminate executives
without pay should a MeToo-type incident arise. As described in Part I, the MeToo

127. See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(distinguishing required showing for breach of implied contract for just cause employment
from that required for breach of an express fixed-term employment contract); supra Part I.A.
128. Pugh, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 211–13; Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 179 P.3d 786, 789
(Utah 2008) (“[U]nsatisfactory job performance would most likely establish just cause . . . .”).
This is not to suggest that these narrow definitions of cause are necessarily inefficient. For
instance, companies may prefer to prioritize other terms of the deal (compensation, restrictive
covenants, etc.) rather than negotiate for a more nuanced definition of cause that may be
difficult to enforce. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 279 (1992)
(suggesting that, owing to the cost of proof, “the employer’s best strategy often is to limit
discharge to egregiously bad performance but routinely to take shirking into account in
connection with salary or promotion”). We are unable to determine from our research what
trade-offs occurred in any one contract with respect to any particular term, a matter we return
to in infra Part IV.A. For our purposes here, what is important is that the definition of cause
in executive contracts markedly diverges from the default definition of the term.
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movement revealed a corporate practice of terminating CEOs who committed sexbased misconduct under the “no cause” provision of the relevant contract. These
failures to invoke the for-cause provisions resulted in a contractual payout to the
CEO, ostensibly rewarding the CEO for misconduct. This choice also communicated
to future CEOs that the company was willing to tolerate this behavior from highlevel employees, diminishing CEO incentives for future compliance. Either
consciously or unconsciously, these CEOs might not have taken the appropriate
degree of care in monitoring their behavior since, prior to MeToo, it was logical to
assume that the costs of misconduct would not be fully internalized by the CEO.
Companies are now putting themselves in a position to reframe this message and
better incentivize CEO compliance. We believe that the changes we see herald
increased monitoring during the course of the relationship backed by the credible
threat of a for-cause termination.
Third, such changes show that corporate boards are responsive to shareholder
concerns. Since the MeToo movement, a number of shareholder lawsuits have been
filed alleging a failure of oversight in identifying and responding to high-level sexbased misconduct in violation of the board’s fiduciary duties to the company.129
These types of derivative suits are challenging to win for a variety of reasons, in
particular the high level of deference granted to boards by the business judgment
rule.130 But the contractual changes that we document actually narrow corporate
boards’ freedom of action under the rule. If a contract contains a very narrow
definition of “cause” typical of pre-MeToo contracts, a board can credibly argue that
its choice to terminate an offending CEO without cause is justified by the desire to
avoid possible litigation and reputational issues that might flow from a for-cause
termination.131 However, by explicitly providing that harassment or discrimination
and violations of company policy are grounds for cause, boards are eliminating that
contractual uncertainty and its attendant legal risks. In effect, these boards are giving
themselves less latitude to avoid a “for cause” termination consistent with their
fiduciary duties.
In sum, these documented shifts in the language of CEO employment contracts
should theoretically affect CEO behavior, as well as the actions of corporate boards
operating in the shadow of the CEO’s contract. The nature and degree of that effect
will depend in part on the specific drafting choices made by the parties in designing
“MeToo termination rights,” a matter we take up in the next subsection.

129. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 14, at 1625–28 (discussing derivative suit against
Wynn Resorts and other post-MeToo filings).
130. Id. at 1628–35 (describing the limited scope of the duties of care and loyalty, as well
as procedural obstacles to successful claims premised on sex-based misconduct).
131. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 72 (Del. 2006)
(affirming that the board did not breach its fiduciary duty in terminating poorly performing
CEO Michael Ovitz without cause and paying severance where the alternatives “at the very
least would have resulted in a costly lawsuit to determine whether Ovitz was so entitled”).
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B. Implications for CEO Employment Contracts
Our results can also be interpreted from the perspective of contract design. This
branch of scholarship offers a framework for understanding the drafting choices of
sophisticated negotiators.132
One insight from this literature is that parties consider a variety of costs in
determining whether to include a particular term in their written contract and, if so,
how it should be drafted.133 As a consequence, contracts are necessarily “incomplete”
in that they do not explicitly address all foreseeable contingencies, such as a lowprobability event for which it would be difficult to negotiate or specify the parties’
obligations.134 Even where the risks justify the transaction costs and reputational risk
involved in introducing a new term, difficulties inherent in enforcing the term
influence how the term is drafted.135 Weighing these costs, parties must determine
how to delineate that particular right or obligation, sometimes described as a choice
between rules and standards.136
Against this backdrop, we offer two observations about CEO contracts postMeToo. First, the movement appears to have altered the cost/benefit analysis for
companies seeking to expand termination rights. Second, in crafting expanded
termination rights, companies may be choosing between greater signaling power and
greater enforcement potential.

132. As one scholar describes it, the “contract design literature focuses on the efficient
design of contracts and [its] connection [to] aspects of contract theory—such as enforcement
and interpretation.” Cathy Hwang, Value Creation by Transactional Associates, 88 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2020).
133. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
114 YALE L.J. 815, 817 (2006) (“By reaching the optimal combination of front-end and backend costs, parties can minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving a particular gain
in contractual incentives.”).
134. There is a deep literature on the notion of “incomplete” contracts, focusing on why
parties omit terms from their contracts and how such “gaps” should be treated by courts. See,
e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory
of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 187, 189–90 (2005); Schwartz, supra note
128, at 308–13; Albert Choi & George G. Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of
Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2008); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial
Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 161
(1994).
135. Scott & Triantis, supra note 133, at 822–23 (distinguishing “front-end” costs,
incurred during contract drafting, from “back-end” enforcement costs, incurred when
litigating disputes).
136. Id. at 839–44; Choi & Triantis, supra note 134 (describing how parties may use
standards like “best efforts,” instead of rules like “work hours” in their contracts); cf. Ronald
J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 330, 347–48 (2005) (explaining that standards, like “material adverse change”
in a contract exit clause, allocate future risks to sellers while rule exceptions shift similar risks
to buyers).
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1. Filling a Contractual Gap
The increase in “MeToo termination rights” likely reflects changes in how
companies price the risk of a MeToo-type event. Contracts without these termination
rights could be described as incomplete as to the effect of sex-based misconduct (as
distinct from other types of wrongful actions). Such contracts do not clearly set out
the company’s termination rights in that context or, more importantly, its financial
obligations to the departing CEO.
There are several possible explanations for this type of gap, particularly in preMeToo contracts. Assuming the company considered the matter, it may have
believed it improbable that its chosen hire would engage in sex-based misconduct or
that, in the event they did so, the cost to the company would be relatively low. 137 If
so, the company likely believed it unnecessary to incur the costs involved in seeking
additional or more explicit termination rights. The drafting costs of including these
additional termination rights may be low in the sense that they do not require lengthy
or complex language. Even so, the bargaining dynamics of asking for these rights
from the CEO (and possible ill will resulting from their negotiation) may militate
against pursuing them—particularly if companies believe they are unlikely to be
used.
This is especially true if such terms are atypical. Contract design literature
suggests that negotiating pairs are reluctant to deviate from conventional patterns of
negotiation, preferring to rely on forms and standard language even in high-stakes,
heavily lawyered transactions.138 A request for contract language addressing sexbased misconduct by the CEO, where such language is outside the norm, risks a
variety of negative signaling effects for the company. 139 It could communicate to
candidates that the company is suspicious of their character and past behavior, or that
the company has a history of workplace harassment and discrimination. Relatedly,
such a request could signal to candidates that the company is likely to be
exceptionally vigilant regarding such matters, which could be concerning to
candidates fearful of unfounded allegations or overzealous enforcement.
The increase in “MeToo termination rights” thus suggests that this cost-benefit
calculus may be changing. This makes sense for at least three reasons. First, the
MeToo movement has demonstrated that sex-based misconduct by high-level actors

137. Such was arguably the case prior to the MeToo movement when companies could
easily and commonly effect a private settlement with the victim. See Gilat Juli Bachar, The
Psychology of Secret Settlements, 73 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4–5 (2022) (describing instances of this
phenomenon); Catherine L. Fisk, Nondisclosure Agreements and Sexual Harassment:
#MeToo and the Change in American Law of Hush Contracts, in THE GLOBAL #METOO
MOVEMENT 475, 475–83 (Ann M. Noel & David B. Oppenheimer eds., 2020) (same). The
enforceability of confidential settlement agreements is currently in flux. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
138. Cf. Davidoff, supra note 21, at 527–28 (suggesting that private equity structure is path
dependent because private equity lawyers are “not incentivized to rethink and renegotiate the
boilerplate,” which is costly).
139. Cf. id. at 530 (explaining that “extralegal forces” and “reputational constraints”
influence contract design, including “bonding, signaling, and understandings” that occur
during negotiations).
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is not a remote possibility. The number of individuals accused in the course of the
MeToo movement, among them many popular and admired public figures, provides
evidence that this behavior is widespread and not perpetrated merely by the rare,
rogue individual.140 Second, the movement has raised the stakes for companies
struggling to manage MeToo-type events. Previously, the primary cost of sex-based
misconduct to the company was the risk of liability to the victim, a price companies
were willing to pay to retain their top leaders.141 This was particularly true when the
settlement could be accompanied by a nondisclosure agreement to mitigate adverse
publicity.142 Post-MeToo, companies face additional risks and costs in the event of
sex-based misconduct, ranging from harmful public relations consequences to
shareholder liability suits.143 They are also less able to resolve MeToo incidents out
of the public eye, owing to new legislation limiting the use of confidential settlement
clauses and private arbitration.144 Third, the penalties associated with raising sexbased misconduct at the bargaining table have likely diminished. With the increased
awareness of the problem, a company’s desire to secure language addressing the risk
of MeToo-type events should not be deemed unusual and would likely involve fewer,
if any, negative signals.145
Finally, the limits of relying on the usual grounds for cause to deal with MeTootype events have come to light. As previously discussed, grounds for cause included
in pre-MeToo contracts, such as criminal behavior and serious misconduct, could

140. Post-Weinstein, These Are the Powerful Men Facing Sexual Harassment Allegations,
supra note 2.
141. See Power and Process, supra note 12, at 95.
142. On the role of confidential settlement agreements and other corporate secrecy
practices in insulating high-profile harassers, see Fisk, supra note 137; Vasundhara Prasad, If
Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through
Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2515–
17 (2018); cf. David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV.
165, 167–68 (2019) (suggesting such agreements may be voided under general contract law).
143. Perhaps the highest profile example was the suit brought against Activision Blizzard.
See Maeve Allsup, Activision Hit with Derivative Suit over Sexual Harassment, BLOOMBERG
L. (Aug. 6, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/activision-blizzard-hit-withderivative-suit-over-sex-harassment [https://perma.cc/EK8X-DRYL]. See generally Hemel &
Lund, supra note 14 (surveying derivative suits). As previously discussed, these suits face a
number of obstacles and most, including the one levied against Activision, have been
dismissed or settled. See id. (explaining the procedural and substantive obstacles to
establishing board liability); supra Part III.A. But such suits can still be costly and operate as
a check on corporate behavior regardless of their outcomes. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi,
Alphabet Settles Shareholder Suits over Sexual Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/technology/google-sexual-harassment-lawsuitsettlement.html [https://perma.cc/TW5R-KA4S]. There is also emerging evidence that
perceptions of workplace culture and the risk of misconduct influence investors. Billings,
Klein & Shi, supra note 15.
144. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
145. The fact that drafting changes are occurring in the highly path-dependent context of
corporate mergers and acquisitions, see Windemuth, supra note 19 (documenting the rise of
“MeToo clauses” in M&A agreements), offers good reason to think that “MeToo termination
rights” will become more acceptable in the CEO contract context.

164

IN D IAN A LA W J O U RN AL

[Vol. 98:125

encompass some types of sex-based misconduct and certainly the most severe.146 But
the dangers of waiting for severe events is exactly the problem. To get ahead of the
situation, companies require greater flexibility than they have generally enjoyed
under the usual grounds for cause. They must design new categories that will better
capture objectionable behavior, expansively defined, allowing for a nimbler
corporate response. The next section considers how companies have done this,
giving closer attention to the drafting choices they have made in adding “MeToo
termination rights” to their contracts.
2. Choosing the Appropriate Term
Once a party determines that a written term is worth its attendant costs, the next
question is how it should be drafted. When contracting parties agree to a performance
term, they must choose a benchmark, or “proxy,” for compliance.147 In the case of
company termination rights, the drafting question posed is essentially the inverse:
how should the parties describe the type of noncompliance that will trigger the
company’s right to terminate for cause? In other words, what constitutes sex-based
misconduct justifying a for-cause termination?148
In the case of “MeToo termination rights,” our results reveal two approaches to
identifying an actionable MeToo-type event. The first and arguably more direct
approach is to include language expressly referring to sexual harassment and
discrimination, what we refer to as a sexual harassment or discrimination (SHD)
clause. This design relies on an external or public proxy: antidiscrimination law. The
second, more opaque approach is to include language referencing violations of
company policies or codes of conduct, what we refer to as a violation of company
policy (VCP) clause. This design relies on an internal proxy: personnel standards
established by the company. These two approaches differ in scope, pose different
enforcement challenges, and likely send different signals to the subject CEOs.
a. Sexual Harassment and Discrimination Clauses
The chief advantage of an SHD clause is likely its strong signaling effect. By
adopting a legal term of art, the company indicates clearly the type of conduct
prohibited and its commitment to MeToo values. Such language places
discrimination on the same level of importance as more typical grounds for

146. See supra Part I.A.
147. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 133, at 818 n.8 (explaining that “proxies” refer to
“operative facts,” which facilitate “compliance with precise and vague contract terms” in
anticipation of contract enforcement).
148. It is worth noting this problem of delineating the type of behavior that justifies
termination or other adverse consequences is not unique to drafting CEO contracts. The
MeToo movement struggled to define its own contours, a matter vigorously debated in the
public realm. The movement spotlighted a wide swath of behaviors, some of which constituted
crimes, some of which would not be considered unlawful even under civil law. See Best
Practices, supra note 6, at 9–10 (providing a taxonomy of MeToo behavior). Questions about
what behavior should be sanctionable, what penalty ought to apply, and in what dimensions
of civic and private life are deeply contested.
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termination, such as material breach of contract. It is also likely to be impactful for
outside observers. While the CEO is the principal audience for this language, the
contract is a public document that can be accessed by interested parties. To the extent
the company wishes to appease activist shareholders or other interest groups that
may scrutinize these contracts, this language could be quite effective.
The pairing of sexual harassment and discrimination in this formulation is also
noteworthy. A chief concern of some antidiscrimination law scholars was the MeToo
movement’s near-exclusive concern with sexualized behavior.149 These thinkers
point out the need to focus on broader forms of sex discrimination, such as implicit
bias, lack of mentoring opportunities, failure to promote, pay inequity, and
nonsexualized gender-based harassment.150 In this respect, an SHD clause not only
has strong signaling value with respect to sex-based misconduct, it conveys broader
values about gender equity and other forms of equal protection.
At the same time, SHD clauses pose problems of scope and enforceability. The
phrase “sexual harassment and discrimination” invokes antidiscrimination law,
making legal principles the benchmark for noncompliance. Existing standards for
what constitutes legally actionable discrimination are difficult to meet and violations
of law notoriously difficult to prove, a long-standing lament of worker protection
advocates.151 To bring a federal claim for a hostile work environment, the cause of
action most suitable to noncriminal MeToo-type events, victims must show that they
were subjected to severe or pervasive sex-based conduct that was objectively and
subjectively offensive.152 Almost every aspect of this definition poses a challenge in
situations where the perceptions of the victim and perpetrator invariably differ. 153
This may make such clauses less effective as a tool for monitoring and disciplining
a wayward CEO, despite their high signaling value at the point of hire. A risk-averse
company may be loath to invoke the clause if it is uncertain about its ability to
substantiate alleged misconduct in the face of a possible challenge by the CEO.
Alternatively, the company might fear that its reliance on such grounds will be cited
by the victim as prima facie evidence of liability for the CEO’s misconduct in a
subsequent discrimination suit. If such concerns make companies reluctant to invoke

149. See Schultz, supra note 12, at 24; Brian Soucek & Vicki Schultz, Sexual Harassment
by Any Other Name, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 227; Power and Process, supra note 12, at 88.
150. See Schultz, supra note 12; Soucek & Schultz, supra note 149; Power and Process,
supra note 12, at 88.
151. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 66; Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Reconsidering Severe
or Pervasive: Aligning the Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes of
Action, 80 IND. L.J. 1119, 1129 (2005) (comparing the higher bar used by some courts to meet
the “severe or pervasive” standard in a sexual harassment case to that used in a racial
harassment case); see also Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms
and Conditions” of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85 (2003) (arguing that many courts have
used the “severe or pervasive” standard to excuse harassment against women).
152. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1998).
153. In other words, whether a company has grounds to terminate for cause under an SHD
clause may be unobservable as well as unverifiable.
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SHD clauses, their inclusion in CEO contracts is not likely to improve the corporate
response to sex-based misconduct.
On the other hand, it is possible that these scope and enforcement difficulties are
of less significance given how CEO terminations are generally effected. Few such
events result in outright disputes but rather are resolved through a quietly negotiated
exit settlement.154 Those that are disputed are generally addressed in private
arbitration rather than in court. 155 Thus, the choice to include an SHD clause lays the
groundwork for a middle-ground exit strategy, one that pairs a no-cause dismissal or
styled resignation with decreased pay and benefits.156
b. Violations of Company Policy Clauses
While the rise in SHD clauses is an important change, we believe that references
to company policy have potentially greater impact. VCP clauses are arguably less
novel than SHD clauses. While the incidence of SHD clauses was negligible prior to
MeToo, the majority of termination provisions already included VCP clauses,
although we see a statistically significant increase in both. 157 VCP clauses are also
less direct in that they do not expressly reference sex-based misconduct or
discrimination. For both of these reasons, VCP clauses likely have less signaling
value than SHD clauses. Indeed, VCP clauses capture sex-based misconduct only
derivatively and might seem to trivialize such behavior, equating it with an array of
minor CEO infractions that could arise under any number of administrative policies.
However, it is precisely because company policies are so wide-ranging that VCP
clauses can be highly impactful. While SHD clauses bring definitions of cause in line
with external law, VCPs make the company the arbiter of wrongful behavior, which
is often defined expansively. For instance, corporate sexual-harassment policies
generally proscribe such behavior in idiosyncratic ways that go beyond the contours
of antidiscrimination law, such as by proscribing all forms of sexual humor or
physical touching irrespective of consent.158 More importantly, company policies
regulate a wide range of lawful behavior that falls well outside the scope of
antidiscrimination law but could have a negative impact based on gender. These
include antifraternization policies, drug and alcohol policies, prohibitions on
personal use of space and resources, rules about expenses and expenditures, conflictof-interest policies, and anti-nepotism policies, among others. Violations of such

154. See generally Ian D. Gow, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Retired or Fired: How
Can Investors Tell if a CEO Was Pressured to Leave?, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Corp.
Governance Rsch. Initiative, Stanford, Cal.), May 25, 2017, at 1 (describing secrecy around
corporate turnover decisions).
155. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 23.
156. While the company and CEO may prefer this result, confidentially negotiated exits
can negatively affect employees’ and outsiders’ perceptions of the company. See Gow,
Larcker & Tayan, supra note 154 (noting that the lack of clarity around executive departures
makes it difficult for shareholders to assess accountability and governance quality).
157. See supra Part II.C.
158. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 2094–99; cf. Elizabeth C. Tippett, Harassment
Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481, 510–13 (2018) (finding
similar overreach in corporate training materials).
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policies could, in some situations, lead to sex-based misconduct, create the
appearance of sexual favoritism, or otherwise adversely affect the workplace
environment.159
We do not consider in this Article the efficacy or appropriateness of such policies
as a general matter.160 Rather, our concern is companies’ ability to act
prophylactically in the face of possible sex-based misconduct by the CEO. Whereas
SHD clauses provide only a narrow, limited standard for what constitutes CEO
noncompliance, VCP clauses provide companies with a capacious rule book, giving
them flexibility to intervene despite uncertainty as to whether the CEO’s behavior
qualifies as unlawful. That is not to suggest that companies should respond with
equal severity to every misdeed. As a matter of general fairness, penalties for CEO
sex-based misconduct should be appropriately tailored to the circumstances, as with
any form of wrongful workplace behavior.161 The point is that VCP clauses give
companies a contract basis for acting promptly rather than awaiting more definitive
and invariably more egregious behavior.
A competing concern about VCP clauses is that their reach may be constrained
by limiting language. As previously discussed, certain grounds for cause are
typically modified by contract language requiring that the proscribed behavior be of
a threshold level of seriousness, cause actual or probable harm, or be committed with
some form of intent. According to our data, while SHD clauses appear never to
contain this type of language, between seventy-two and eighty-nine percent of VCP
clauses in each year of our sample do. 162 Such language narrows the reach of those
clauses and may increase enforcement costs in close cases by diminishing the
verifiability advantage associated with established rules as performance proxies.
We do not find this to be a per se concern, however, given the expansiveness and
diversity of company policies. Certainly not every violation of a company policy
should be deemed a terminable offense, and it is unsurprising that CEOs would
bargain for (and companies agree to) such limitations. We are mindful, though, that
extensive and heavily layered language constraining the types of policy violations
that constitute cause could significantly undermine the value of such a clause. For
example, the final contract between Harvey Weinstein and his film company
included a VCP clause so heavily modified by limiting language that, ironically, it

159. See Leong, supra note 54, at 958–74 (discussing the adverse impact of consensual
workplace relationships on third parties and institutions); cf. Green, supra note 34 (rejecting
the possibility of consensual relationships between influential executives and their
subordinates).
160. Indeed, the consensus of antidiscrimination scholars is that sexual harassment policies
alone do little to improve gender equity, and overbroad policies can backfire or have other
harmful effects on workers. See EDELMAN, supra note 11, at 101; Frank Dobbin & Erin L.
Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal Compliance in
Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOCIO. 1203, 1203–05 (2007); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights:
Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 83, 87 (2005).
161. Power and Process, supra note 12, at 25.
162. See supra Table 5.
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might not capture behavior that would satisfy the legal standard for unlawful sexual
harassment.163
We do not judge our overall data, however, based on the bespoke contract of one
especially egregious bad actor.164 The critical point is that corporate policies go
beyond proscriptions against discrimination in establishing the contours of
professional workplace behavior. Thus, VCP clauses will generally give companies
greater ability to anticipate sex-based misconduct than SHD clauses and ultimately
greater freedom to terminate CEOs for cause, although limiting language will play a
role in how companies exercise those rights.
C. Implications for the MeToo Accountability Problem
A significant implication of our findings for workplace gender equity is the
promise of increased accountability for sex-based misconduct. As previously
discussed, the MeToo movement revealed not just widespread sex-based misconduct
by CEOs and others in power, but companies’ willingness to ignore or cover up the
problem when perpetrated by powerful, high-level actors.165 The introduction of
“MeToo termination rights” into CEO contracts has the potential to alter this
dynamic in a number of ways.
As previously discussed, these rights give companies greater latitude to terminate
for cause in cases of sex-based misconduct not sufficiently egregious to trigger other
grounds. This can be especially important in situations where the underlying facts
are contested,166 or the CEO’s conduct is not clearly unlawful but falls close to the

163. The contract defined cause to include “a willful violation of the Code of Conduct if it
is determined by a vote of a majority of the Board [including one Co-Chairman] that such
violation has caused serious harm to the Company.” Letter Agreement from Weinstein
Company Holdings to Harvey Weinstein 12–13 (Oct. 20, 2015) (emphasis added) (on file with
author). By comparison, unlawful sexual harassment does not require willfulness, nor does it
invariably cause serious harm to the company. Rather, the principal harm is to the victim, and
whatever consequences may ensue to the company (e.g., liability for the violation) may not be
especially “serious” from a business or financial perspective, particularly in the case of a single
incident. For this and other reasons, it is likely that Weinstein’s contract was intentionally
drafted to insulate him from any employment-related consequences for engaging in sex-based
misconduct rather than to lay the basis for disciplining such behavior. See Best Practices,
supra note 6, at 18–22 (providing a detailed explication of Weinstein’s contract).
164. Weinstein’s contract is not a public document because his former company was
privately held, and it is therefore not part of our pre-MeToo sample.
165. See supra note 7.
166. Notably, several individuals accused of sex-based misconduct during the MeToo
movement staunchly defended their behavior as consensual. See Katie Benner, Silicon Valley
Investor Takes Leave of Absence After Harassment Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/technology/shervin-pishevar-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/HGR4-295B] (reporting that investor Shervin Pishevar, after being accused
of sexual harassment by five women, claimed that “any accusations were part of a plot . . . to
smear him”); Russell Simmons’s Statement on Rape Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/arts/music/russell-simmons-statement.html
[https://perma.cc/LV2B-BYFG] (providing a statement from Russell Simmons denying
accusations of rape and stating that “all of my relations have been consensual”); Graham
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line.167 The existence of “MeToo termination rights”—and in particular the inclusion
of violations of company policy as grounds for cause—reduces the risk of contract
liability that might otherwise disincentivize a for-cause termination in those
circumstances.
However, we see “MeToo termination rights” as more than an on-off lever to be
invoked at the point of exit. The law of hostile work-environment liability offers a
useful lens for considering the range of possible effects. Under federal
antidiscrimination law, a company is vicariously liable for hostile work-environment
harassment perpetrated by an alter ego of the company, such as a CEO. 168 But where
ordinary supervisors are concerned, the employer can avoid liability if it can
establish, among other things, that it took reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassment.169

Kates, Women Suing Charlie Rose Make New Claims of Sexual Harassment, CBS NEWS (Apr.
2, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/women-suing-charlie-rose-make-newclaims-of-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/22JR-N4GA] (“Mr. Rose vigorously denies
the claims. He did not physically or verbally sexually harass these plaintiffs.”).
167. This would be particularly important in situations where a CEO engages in an
inappropriate, but consensual, relationship. See Haddon, supra note 50; Don Clark, Intel
C.E.O. Brian Krzanich Resigns After Relationship with Employee, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/technology/intel-ceo-resignsconsensual-relationship.html [https://perma.cc/4G8F-X4ZP] (describing an investigation into
Brian Krzanich’s consensual relationship with an Intel employee that violated a
nonfraternization policy applicable to managers); Christopher Drew, Lockheed’s Incoming
Chief Forced Out over Ethics Violation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/business/lockheed-citing-ethics-violation-saysincoming-chief-has-quit.html [https://perma.cc/8ARA-LQ2Y] (reporting the dismissal of the
chief operating officer following an investigation that showed he had a “long-standing
relationship with a female employee”).
168. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 679 F.3d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding “supervisors
to be of sufficiently high rank to qualify as an employer’s proxy or alter ego when the
supervisor is ‘a president, owner, proprietor, partner, corporate officer,’ or otherwise highlypositioned in the management hierarchy”) (quoting Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d 725, 730 (7th
Cir. 2000)); Dees v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 421–22 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[A]n employer can be held vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment . .
. [if] the supervisor holds such a high position in the company that he could be considered the
employer’s ‘alter ego’ . . . . ”) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (citing Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)).
169. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (articulating affirmative defense
comprising “two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise”); Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 807
(same). This so-called Ellerth-Faragher defense has been subject to significant criticism. See,
e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 66, at 151–57; Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is
Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 731–32 (2000)
(arguing that strict liability for supervisor harassment, rather than the compromise rule adopted
by the Supreme Court, would create a stronger incentive to prevent sexual harassment claims);
Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative
Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004) (“By hinging liability on a response to
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“MeToo termination rights” serve both these purposes. As a preventative tool, the
terms operate at the hiring stage to flush out potential offenders. Candidates who
object to them or seek significant concessions in exchange would bring higher
scrutiny on their preemployment conduct. In addition, the inclusion of the terms sets
the expectation for the relationship, placing the candidate on notice that this behavior
will not be tolerated and that compliance will be monitored. This likely has a
deterrent effect over the course of employment.
In the same way, “MeToo termination rights” also open the possibility of effective
corrective action short of termination. Not all acts of sex-based misconduct
necessarily justify termination.170 With rank-and-file workers, companies typically
use formal or informal systems of progressive discipline in sanctioning unwanted
behavior.171 Companies could discipline CEOs for sex-based misconduct even
absent “MeToo termination rights.” But the force behind any act of employer
discipline is the ultimate threat of termination. Against the backdrop of “MeToo
termination rights,” companies have the ability to credibly, but proportionally,
intervene in the face of questionable behavior and hopefully both correct and prevent
sex-based misconduct.
Finally, “MeToo termination rights” set a consistent message at the top of the
corporate hierarchy that can have implications for the workplace at large. For
decades, companies have maintained company-wide sexual harassment policies,
sponsored trainings, and touted their commitments to equal employment opportunity
compliance and inclusivity.172 The MeToo movement revealed that high-level
executives have been playing by a different rule book, literally and figuratively. Not
only were the most egregious perpetrators permitted to offend over and over again

harassment that is uncommon [i.e., victim reporting], especially in cases involving
supervisors, the Court created a legal rule that from its inception was unlikely to promote the
stated goal of prevention.”); McGinley, supra note 13 (arguing that courts should abolish the
Ellerth-Faragher defense “because it serves as a shield against liability but does not operate
to limit or prevent sex- or gender-based harassment”). Much of the critique concerns the way
the defense has been interpreted and applied by courts. See, e.g., Heather S. Murr, The
Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual
Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529,
605–06 (2006) (finding that “lower courts’ analysis of whether the employer has satisfied its
burden of proof . . . is often cursory and, at times, virtually nonexistent”); see David Sherwyn,
Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800”
Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. R EV. 1265, 1289 (2001)
(finding in examination of published judicial opinions that the majority of courts apply the
affirmative defense in a manner favorable to employers). That debate falls outside the scope
of this Article. Our purpose in drawing on the defense is to consider the ways in which the
advent of “MeToo termination rights” in CEO contracts might advance its underlying goals.
170. See Power and Process, supra note 12, at 97.
171. See id. (explaining that in workforces using progressive discipline, employees face
escalating penalties for each infraction and, in some cases, can challenge their employer’s
decision to terminate them).
172. Tippett, supra note 16, at 244. There is an extensive legal and sociological literature
suggesting that such polices and trainings have symbolic value to companies. See EDELMAN,
supra note 11; Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 163.
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without consequence, in some cases their contracts seemed to anticipate and condone
that very sequence of events. The termination provision of Harvey Weinstein’s
contract, for instance, permitted him to “cure” any behavior giving rise to cause by
making the company whole for any resulting losses.173 In other words, if Weinstein
committed sex-based misconduct sufficiently egregious to constitute cause under the
exceedingly narrow definition contained in his contract, he could simply pay back
the cost of any judgment or settlement his conduct incurred.174 The adoption of
“MeToo termination rights” stands in sharp contrast to contracts like Weinstein’s
and promises a change in step from this type of protectionism and disparate standards
that enabled his ongoing misconduct.
IV. THE LIMITS OF “METOO TERMINATION RIGHTS”
Our results reveal a statistically significant shift in the language of CEO contracts,
reflecting companies’ increased attention to the problem of high-level, sex-based
misconduct and commitment to improved workplace equity. The drafting changes
we document signal to CEOs that companies will no longer tolerate the type of
behavior implicitly condoned by some companies prior to MeToo. They also give
companies the power to follow through on that message, expanding their rights to
terminate for cause in situations that would previously have risked costly litigation.
This puts in place expectations at the top of the organizational hierarchy, setting a
tone that will likely follow through to the rest of the company.
At the same time, we recognize the limitations of both our research design and
ultimately our results. Even with the addition of “MeToo termination rights,” CEO
contracts remain highly favorable to the executive. Nor can we predict whether and

173. In defining “cause,” the Weinstein contract states: “For purposes of this Agreement,
‘[C]ause’ shall mean only: (i) a willful failure or refusal by you to follow [Board instructions]
or your knowingly taking any action [requiring Board approval] without approval; (ii) the
perpetuation by you of a material fraud against the Company [determined through arbitration];
(iii) a conviction for a felony involving fraud, dishonesty or moral turpitude, after the
exhaustion of all possible appeals; (iv) an indictment for [such a felony] if it is determined by
a vote of the majority of the Board [including one Co-Chairman] to cause serious harm to the
Company; (v) a willful violation of the Code of Conduct if it is determined by a vote of a
majority of the Board [including one Co-Chairman] that such violation has caused serious
harm to the Company; or (vi) a material breach by you of [this agreement] provided that, in
the case of each of clauses (i), (v) and (vi) above, the Board has first notified you in writing,
within a reasonable time . . . of such action or omission by you . . . and you have not cured the
particular action or omission complained of within thirty (30) days . . . provided further . . .
the payment by you of any costs incurred by the Company as a result of a violation of [this
agreement] shall constitute a cure of such violations.” Best Practices, supra note 6, at 18–19
(alterations in original) (quoting Letter Agreement from Weinstein Company Holdings to
Harvey Weinstein 12–13 (Oct. 20, 2015) (on file with author)).
174. See generally Best Practices, supra note 6, at 19 (explaining how the narrow
definition of cause, the lack of a “catch-all” provision, the requirement of a willful violation
of the company Code of Conduct, and the other qualifying language of the employment
contract insulated Weinstein against the risk of termination for harassment and misconduct);
supra Part II.B.2 (noting uniquely pro-executive terms of Weinstein’s contract).
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how companies will exercise these newly created rights. We explore some of those
limitations here, highlighting areas for further research.
A. Contract Tradeoffs and the Persistence of Procedural Protections
As we have seen, the typical definition of cause includes multiple distinct
grounds. These comprise a component of the contract termination provision, which
itself is but one term of the parties’ overall agreement. Our research design examined
the incidence of particular grounds for cause within each contract termination
provision in our sample. We did not examine the individual grounds for cause vis-àvis one another within particular contracts, nor did we examine termination
provisions in relation to other terms of the contract. This raises several questions
about the relationship between contract terms and CEO bargaining power, opening
areas for possible future research.
First, we are unable to delineate what would constitute an optimal CEO
employment contract. Any individual contract is the result of the idiosyncratic
interests of the parties and their distinct bargaining positions. In particular, we cannot
observe which, if any, tradeoffs are being struck at the bargaining table in exchange
for expanded “MeToo termination rights.” It is possible that CEOs are insisting that
companies dial back other grounds to compensate for the pro-company expansions
we document. It is also possible that any such tradeoffs are effected through other
contract terms, such as increases in pay or benefits.
That said, we do not believe that such tradeoffs—assuming they occur—
undermine the importance of our results. If companies are purchasing “MeToo
termination rights” through other concessions, it may be that, on balance, these
agreements still reflect some of the same overall inefficiencies that agency theory
predicts. But that does not diminish the importance of the changes we document:
they reflect companies’ attention to the MeToo movement and a new willingness to
overcome existing bargaining norms in order to advance MeToo values.
Second, our conclusions do not integrate other pro-CEO protections that could
diminish the value of “MeToo termination rights.” For instance, we find that eightyfour percent of CEO contracts include some form of “procedural protection”
designed to ensure the accuracy and appropriateness of companies’ invocation of
for-cause termination rights.175 As described in Part II, these generally afford a
degree of due process protection for the accused CEO, such as the right to receive a
written description of the basis for cause, a forum to dispute the accuracy of the
charges, and an opportunity to cure any wrongdoing. They may also impose
requirements and limitations on the company’s exercise of its power to terminate,
such as a duty to act in good faith. Our review of the incidence of such protections
does not reveal any meaningful change post-MeToo, meaning CEOs are free to avail
themselves of these protections in response to companies’ invocation of their newly
added termination rights. This may limit companies’ ability to effectively exercise
those rights, particularly where the company has invoked an SHD clause that uses a
legal standard as the proxy for cause. As discussed in Part III, the elements of sexual

175. See supra Table 6.
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harassment are difficult to prove, making the outcome in any termination premised
on its existence subject to challenge.
B. Paper Versus Practice
Another uncertainty is the durability of the changes we have identified and their
ultimate effects. Our research presents a look at CEO contracts in the years
immediately surrounding the beginning of the MeToo movement. We do not know
whether the changes we document will endure in the years to come, nor do we know
how these changes will be implemented on the ground.
First, it is possible that the change we see is momentary and fleeting, an
immediate response to a powerful, but short-lived, movement. Notably, our postMeToo sample ends in March 2020, the point in time at which the COVID-19
pandemic took center stage in the public consciousness. However, we believe that
the changes that we find will both increase and maintain their staying power. Our
post-MeToo sample captures only the first two years of the movement—a period of
time that may be too short to capture its full effect on contracting. According to the
2006 study, the most common duration for CEO contracts was three years (followed
by five years).176 Thus, only a subset of companies within the sample years had
occasion to hire or renew a CEO contract since MeToo. We suspect that these
changes will continue as companies have the opportunity to revisit individual CEO
contracts.
This prediction is strengthened by the general path dependency of contract terms,
that is, the likelihood that they will become embedded once agreed to.177 We believe
that this force alone is powerful enough to ensure that the current trends continue.
The changes in CEO contracts today are likely to be preserved in the draft
agreements and form contracts of tomorrow, making it likely that the inclusion of
“MeToo termination rights” becomes standard in definitions of cause, even when
attention drifts to other issues.178
Despite our belief that the changes we see in executive contracts are likely to
persist, our results cannot tell us how companies will use their “MeToo termination
rights.” Companies have put CEOs on notice that sex-based misconduct will not be
tolerated, and they have negotiated the necessary rights to back up that claim.
However, enforcement is another question; we cannot tell whether companies will

176. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 23, at 247.
177. See Davidoff, supra note 21, at 529 (“Path dependency is created by market
participants’ paying heed to the market norm and their desire not to stray too far.”); Matthew
Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71, 89 (2018) (“Market
complexity can lead parties to standardize contract terms, which can exhibit network effects
that introduce path dependencies into the contract design process.”).
178. See Davidoff, supra note 21, at 528 (“[F]irst-agreed terms are ‘locked-in,’ become
boilerplate, and may persist . . . . In these later contractual iterations, parties do not renegotiate
these terms due to the costs associated with such a change.”); Jennejohn, supra note 177, at
90 (“Widely adopted standardized terms allow parties to reduce both front-end negotiating
costs—both parties to the deal understand the common language, which can streamline costly
dickering—and back-end enforcement costs—if a court has given a standard term a definitive
interpretation, then enforcement uncertainty can be reduced.”).
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exercise those rights and under what circumstances. Indeed, companies are often
reluctant to terminate for cause, contract language notwithstanding.179 Even so, this
revised language will change the bargaining positions of the parties at the point of
exit. In other words, even if companies persist in using the no-cause option when
terminating CEOs, any increased willingness to terminate, and to do so on less
favorable terms, can itself be seen as a victory for the MeToo movement. 180
Finally, we note that disciplining bad actors is not the same as eliminating sexbased misconduct, which itself is only one aspect of improving gender equity. While
such matters fall outside the scope of our study, we note anecdotally that, in tandem
with the changes we document, companies have announced a variety of plans aimed
at those goals.181 Future research may determine the degree to which these actions
correspond to the changes we document, as well as their long-term effect.
CONCLUSION
A critical question post-MeToo is whether the power of that social movement has
translated into real change in the organizational response to sex-based misconduct.

179. This problem was made infamous by the 2005 shareholder derivative action brought
against the Walt Disney Company in connection with the costly “no cause” termination of
CEO Michael Ovitz. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). That litigation challenged the board’s $140 million
payout to Michael Ovitz after his brief and stormy tenure as CEO, arguing that the board
breached its fiduciary duty to the company by not opting to proceed on for cause. Id. at 70–
74. For background on the case, see generally Holger Spamann, Corporate Law — Fiduciary
Duties of Directors — Delaware Court of Chancery Finds Disney Directors Not Liable for
Approval of an Employment Agreement Providing $140 Million in Termination Payments. —
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, No. Civ. A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 9, 2005)., 119 HARV. L. REV. 923 (2006) (analyzing the court’s conclusion that none of
the officers or directors of the Walt Disney Company breached their fiduciary duties). For
other cases in which an executive may have been terminated for cause but instead received a
payout, see Shabbouei v. Laurent, No. 2018-0847-JRS, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 121 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 2, 2020); MMC Energy, Inc. v. Miller, No. 08 Civ. 4353(DAB), 2009 WL 2981914
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2009); In re Am. Apparel, Inc. 2014 Derivative S’holder Litig., No. CV14-05230-MWF, 2015 WL 12724070, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015), aff’d sub nom. In re
Am. Apparel, Inc., 2014 Derivative S’holder Litig. v. Charney, 696 F. App’x 848 (9th Cir.
2017) (holding that the termination of a former American Apparel CEO not for cause despite
sexual harassment allegations was not a breach of the board of directors’ fiduciary duty).
180. We recognize that other forces of corporate-governance are likely at work in this area,
including market forces. See, e.g., Mooibroek & Verschoor, supra note 15 (finding that
investors react negatively to companies that experience MeToo incidents); Veronica Root
Martinez, A More Equitable Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE
PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021) (arguing
that the newfound urge of corporations to reevaluate their corporate purpose due to social
movements such as MeToo and Black Lives Matter should consider the historical disparities
that permeated society when the widely accepted corporate-purpose theories were created).
We also recognize that other types of corporate-governance reforms may address the concerns
we have raised here. See, e.g., Hersch, supra note 14 (proposing that workers receive a hazardpay premium for exposure to risk of sexual harassment).
181. See generally Miazad, Corporate Governance, supra note 4.
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This Article provides proof that it has. Our study of nearly 500 CEO contracts reveals
that, post-MeToo, publicly traded companies are reserving greater discretion to
terminate executives for sex-based misconduct in statistically significant numbers.
By insisting on expanded contractual definitions of “cause” to terminate, these
companies are signaling to CEOs that such behavior will not be tolerated. They are
also reducing the risks and costs that previously deterred corporate boards from
penalizing wayward CEOs.
In this way, this Article has implications beyond the discrete though important
problem of sex-based misconduct. The post-MeToo changes documented here reveal
that CEO-company bargaining dynamics and the resulting contracts are responsive
to external shocks. In the wake of the MeToo movement, companies have departed
from past drafting practice to negotiate language giving them greater control over
CEO behavior. To be sure, CEO employment contracts—with their narrow and
exclusive grounds for cause—remain highly favorable to CEOs, at least when
compared to the rights of employees generally. However, the space to engage in sexbased (and potentially other forms of) misconduct that was previously afforded to
CEOs is diminishing. This result promises not only reduced corporate tolerance and
greater accountability for sex-based misconduct, but more meaningful oversight of
CEO behavior generally.

